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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

No. 1466

SELECTIONS FROM SOVIET
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USSR REPORT
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SELECTIONS FROM SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY JOURNALS

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NIGERIAN ECONOMIC, FOREIGN POLICIES UNDER SHAGARI DESCRIBED

Moscow POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE in Russian No 6, Jun 83 pp 98-105

[Article by Yu. Doletov, under rubric "At the Political Map of the World":
"Nigeria: Ordeals and Hopes"]

[Excerpts] The victory at the election was won by the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), and its leader, Shehu Shagari, became the president, to whom the military regime turned over the power at the established time limit. Shehu Shagari advanced as the first-priority tasks in his government the upsurge of the agriculture and the development of industry, the extension of housing construction, the improvement of the system of public education and public health, and the accelerated building of Nigeria's new capital, Abuji. On the international scene the civil authorities adhere to a policy of nonalignment.

The country has a number of progressive organizations which have been refused registration as political parties. The most significant of them is the Socialist Party of the Workers of Nigeria, which is in favor of fundamental socio-economic reforms in the interests of the working people.

A group that is taking on greater and greater strength is the Nigerian proletariat, which currently numbers 4 million persons. The proletariat has been united in 70 branch trade unions that are part of the country's single central trade-union organization -- the Nigerian Labor Congress. The workers, together with the peasants, took active part in the anticolonial struggle. After the winning of independence, during the difficult period for the young republic, they acted as the initiators for the creation of the "unity fund," paying into it a 5-percent deduction from their earnings. From year to year there has been an increase in the political awareness of the workers and a rise in the level of general education and occupational training.

With the end of the civil war and the reinforcement of political independence, the young state extended the struggle for economic independence. At that stage a problem that arose with all acuity was the problem of confirming its legal right to dispose of its own natural resources, primarily petroleum, in the interests of the nation.

In April 1971 the National Oil Corporation was created in the country. The authorities granted it broad rights in organizing its own oil industry -- from

prospecting for the "black gold" to the sale of petroleum products, granting the opportunity to appropriate the property of any foreign oil company on the territory of the country.

By means of consistent measures -- shared participation in the production and export of petroleum with a number of Western firms, the withdrawal of a controlling block of shares from branches of foreign firms that produce the "black gold" in the country -- state control was established over that very important branch of the economy. As a result of those measures, the steady increase in production, and the rise in prices for output, the income from petroleum in 1980 came to \$25 billion (ten years ago it was only \$240 million).

It should be noted that the country's economy has a clearly expressed capitalist nature. However, it has at its disposal a considerable state sector and is developing in an acute struggle with the imperialistic powers, which are attempting to keep the former colony in the role of supplier of cheap raw materials. For purposes of the further weakening of the influence exerted by the foreign monopolies and protecting the country's own interests, a number of national corporations for the development of mineral resources were established. In addition, there has been a reduction in the currency drain as a result of the "Nigerianization" of the personnel in foreign firms and the transferral to local entrepreneurs of various commercial and medium industrial enterprises that previously belonged to foreigners. The state has also provided itself with 40-percent participation in the affairs of foreign banks.

The considerable income from petroleum (80 percent of the total budgetary proceeds) has made it possible to finance the plans for the development of the country for 1970-1974 and 1975-1980. Within the framework of those programs, a number of enterprises have been constructed in the extracting and processing industry, including such large-scale enterprises as the oil refinery in Warri, cement plants in Shagamu, Ashake, Sokoto, and a paint factory in Enugu.

The relatively rapid development of the Nigerian economy as a result of the income from petroleum has contributed to the growth of the gross national product (to \$47 billion), judged on the basis of which Nigeria has firmly become one of the ten largest developing countries in the world.

The Nigerian authorities are becoming increasingly convinced that "black gold" is an unreliable source of currency proceeds. As a result of the reduction in the demand in the capitalist world for the liquid fuel, as well as the sabotage that was organized by the Western monopolies, the production of Nigerian petroleum has several times fallen sharply from 2 million barrels a day to 700,000 (one barrel equals 159 liters), thus leading to a considerable drop in income.

In order to reduce the country's dependence upon the petroleum sales conditions, a number of steps have been taken. The emphasis has been made upon the reinforcement of the state sector, the creation of enterprises of importance to the entire national economy. For example, in the course of the carrying out of the 4th Five-Year Development Plan (1981-1985) it is planned to construct two enterprises for the compression of natural gas, three plants for the production of 210,000 tons of rolled steel each, to start up coal mines and to begin extracting the iron ore that has been prospected with the aid of Soviet geologists.

One of the most important new projects is the metallurgical combine in Abeokuta, which is being built with the cooperation of the Soviet Union. With the starting up of the first phase, the enterprise will be producing 1.3 million tons of steel a year. Subsequently it is planned to build up its capacity, first to 2.6, and then to 5 million tons. All this will make it possible to accelerate considerably the industrialization of Nigeria. The combine will become a base for the creation of machine-building plants and the manufacture of Nigeria's own machine tools and equipment, and this, in the final analysis, will make it easier for the country to achieve its economic independence.

Another important trend in economic development is the upsurge of agriculture. Prior to the 1970's, that is, before the petroleum boom, agriculture was the basic branch of the national economy. Its share in the overall production came to 64 percent. That gave rise, in the minds of a certain part of Nigerian society, to the illusion that everything was going well in the rural areas. Actually, however, the state of agriculture, and the living and working conditions of most of the peasants, remained just as difficult as they had been under the colonial government.

The Shehu Shagari government, taking into consideration the errors of past years, took a decisive course aimed at the reorganization of agriculture. The great importance attached to this sector is attested to by the appropriations which are being given to it in the 4th Five-Year Development Plan -- 2.3 billion *nair*. It is typical that the steps that are planned provide for something that had never been previously planned -- the comprehensive resolution of problems. Attention is being directed to supplying the farmers with technology, mineral fertilizers, herbicides, and to teaching the peasants modern methods for growing various crops. Large-scale state farms and irrigation structures are being created throughout the country, new land is being assimilated, roads are being laid, etc.

In addition to the upsurge of the economy in Nigeria, a lot is being done to resolve other internal problems. For example, primary schools have introduced free instruction, and the number of secondary educational institutions and universities in the country has been increased. During the current five-year plan alone it is planned to open six new secondary technical educational institutions and seven universities with a basic emphasis on technology. Considerable amounts of money are being appropriated for public health and for housing construction.

When he began to control the country in October 1979, Shehu Shagari announced that the civil government would adhere to the foreign-policy course that had been worked out by M. Muhammed and O. Obasanjo. Nigeria's practical acts on the international scene confirm that that announcement was simply a declaration. The basic direction in the country's foreign policy continues to be the struggle against the vestiges of colonialism and against racism and apartheid in South Africa. At sessions of the UN General Assembly and Security Council, and at the OAU, Nigeria speaks out in favor of the radical settlement of the conflict in the south of Africa by the transferral of authority to the African majority, and rejects the maneuvers of the Western powers who are attempting to preserve the racist regime there.

The Shehu Shagari government defends on the international scene the positive shifts that have been achieved. Nigeria supports the Soviet initiatives that are directed at the preservation and consolidation of peace on the planet, the limitation of the arms race, and the development of international cooperation. These positions of Nigeria in the area of foreign policy contribute to the growth of the authority of the young state on the world scene. A manifestation of the independent course of Nigeria in international affairs is its active participation in the nonalignment movement, the expansion of its cooperation with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with independent Nigeria in 1960. That agreement was not a formal act, but, rather, an event of great importance in the life of the two peoples. It symbolized the striving of the USSR and one of the largest African countries, a country that had thrown off its colonial yoke, to strengthen the bonds of friendship and it subsequently became the point of departure for the development of multilateral close ties.

During the first years of the existence of the young state, the forces that were actively in favor of the preservation of the colonial orders created a large number of obstacles on the path of the development of friendly relations between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Nigeria. However, life itself showed the Nigerians who is their true friend.

Characterizing the position of the USSR during the years of the internal crisis in Nigeria, the governmental newspaper MORNING POST commented, "Friends in need are friends indeed. We constantly salute the remarkable Soviet nation, which came to our aid during our most difficult hour. And so long as Federal Nigeria exists, from generation to generation, stories will be told about that aid, and the love and respect for the Soviet nation will remain forever in the hearts of Nigerians."

The consistent and well-principled position of the Soviet Union in the Nigerian question led to the expansion of Soviet-Nigerian ties in various areas, and to the drawing closer together of the positions taken by the two countries with regard to the most important international problems. The USSR has demonstrated by concrete acts its benevolent attitude to the postwar development of the young state, to its striving to resolve successfully the complicated tasks of national construction.

Thus, on the basis of a trade agreement signed by the two countries, the Soviet Union delivers to Nigeria machinery and equipment, cable articles, cement, window glass, and various consumer goods. In its turn, the USSR purchases in Nigeria the items of traditional Nigerian export -- cocoa beans, tropical wood, palm oil, and other commodities.

A broad road to mutually advantageous ties was opened up by the agreement of economic and scientific-technical cooperation that was signed on 21 November 1968. A concrete embodiment of the agreement is the institute that was opened in 1975 in the city of Warri for the training of specialists for the petroleum industry; another is the Warri-Ikorodu-Ilorin petroleum

pipeline, which runs for more than 900 kilometers, and which was laid with the technical assistance of the USSR; and also the metallurgical combine that is under construction in Abeokuta, which is the largest one in Tropical Africa.

Since 1960, more than a thousand young Nigerians have received higher and secondary special education in the USSR. They are now working successfully at industrial enterprises and construction sites in the country. Soviet doctors, engineers, and teachers are well known in Nigeria. They are prized for their proficiency and their readiness to share their experience and knowledge with the Africans.

The ties between the two countries are also expanding in other areas. Exchanges of parliamentary delegations are becoming common practice. Firm contacts have been established between performing artists, composers, writers, journalists, and athletes. An important role in the development of the cultural exchange between the two countries belongs to the "USSR-Nigeria" Friendship Society and the Association of Nigerian-Soviet Friendship and Cultural Ties, which has dozens of branches in all the states.

Soviet-Nigerian relations have withstood the test of time and stand on a solid foundation. Soviet citizens treasure the friendship with the Nigerian nation and are doing a lot to assure that that friendship grows and becomes stronger for the good of both countries, in the interests of peace throughout the world. The experience of cooperation with the USSR gives the Nigerians new incentives in the achievement of true independence and reinforces their assurance that they have someone from whom they can find understanding and support.

The way that Nigeria has traveled during the years of its independent existence has been a thorny and difficult one. Throughout those years the young state achieved considerable successes in economic and domestic-policy development, and in the reinforcement of its authority in Africa and on the international scene. Nigerians want to see their country prospering and, relying upon the support of their friends, they are applying serious efforts in the attainment of that noble goal.

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GRENADAN ENVOY ON NEW JEWEL HISTORY, POLICIES

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 83 pp 33-49

/Article by W. Richard Jacobs, Grenada: "The Revolutionary Process in Grenada"

/Text/ In March 1983 the people of Grenada celebrated the fourth anniversary of the victory of revolution. At the request of the editorial board Richard Jacobs, Grenada's ambassador to the USSR, prepared this article on the basic directions in the revolutionary transformations.

More than four years ago, on 13 March 1979, the people of Grenada, led by their vanguard, the New JEWEL Movement Party, rose in an armed insurrection, which marked the beginning of a new stage in the country's history. Today the gains of the revolution are under the reliable protection of its moving forces, and they are being developed successfully. When Maurice Bishop, the country's prime minister, visited Moscow in July 1982, he described the revolutionary achievements, calling the Grenadan revolution profoundly democratic, anti-imperialist in its essence and firmly established on a path of socialist orientation.

In the international realm the policy of Grenada's revolutionary government is based on the principles of nonalignment and anti-imperialist struggle: it advocates the idea of creating a new international economic order; it promotes the processes of regional cooperation and integration; it participates actively in the struggle for peace and international cooperation; and it provides support for national liberation movements. That is why Maurice Bishop stated seven months after the victory of the Grenada Revolution, when he spoke at the 6th Conference of the Heads of State from the Participating Countries in the Nonaligned Movement: "Nonalignment, as we understand it, in no way means that we must take a position of neutrality in the emasculated and negative sense of this concept; and in exactly the same way it does not mean that our country must play the role of a political eunuch... On the contrary, we view nonalignment as a positive ideological current, which arouses us to take a principled and decisive position on international problems."

This position was clearly outlined in a speech which Bishop made to a rally for international solidarity with the Grenadan revolution. "Grenada," Bishop

noted, "supports the condemnation of exploitation, injustice and inhumanity in all of their manifestations and forms. We shall continue to march in the ranks of the fighters, our voice will not be stilled."

Our confidence is not accidental. It is based on the revolutionary energy and traditions of our people. The fact that the people of Grenada achieved freedom and are full of confidence in their own powers is in itself an important achievement for a small country which is located in direct proximity to the USA, where imperialist circles have been unsuccessful in their attempts to strangle the young revolution. In this way Grenada's experience enriches the treasure house of the world revolutionary movement and deserves the most concentrated attention from researchers who will study the essence and basic features of the Grenadan revolution.

The path to revolution

The revolutionary process which is developing in Grenada is the logical continuation of the national liberation struggle, which began in 1973. Grenada, a former colony of Great Britain, formally received independence in 1974. However, the country continued to be dependent; its neocolonial subordination was carried out by the pro-imperialist puppet government headed by Eric Gairy. He began his political career in the colonial years and gained a certain popularity in 1951, when he led the struggle for the rights of agricultural workers. Nonetheless, the colonial powers soon "tamed" him. Gairy began to advocate development of the economy along capitalist lines and took a hard, anticommunist position. This led to Grenada being drawn into the orbit of influence of the most conservative pro-imperialist circles.

Naturally this policy did not meet the fair demands of the people. The broad masses of the population expressed their ever increasing dissatisfaction with the regime and with those who represented it. In order to retain power in his own hands Gairy developed a political mechanism which was characterized by unlimited personal and arbitrary rule, by corruption and the systematic violation of the basic human rights. This mechanism was based on the widespread application of police terror and repressive acts against all opposition organizations, as well as individuals.

The revolutionary movement developed under these conditions. Its sources go back to the activities of the mass organizations of that time, especially the trade unions, which, in 1970 organized the first mass protests by industrial enterprise workers against the worsening of living and working conditions. It should be noted that certain workers organizations, in particular the American Institute for the Development of Free Labor, were under the traditional influence of U.S. imperialist circles and were headed by anti-democratically inclined, opportunistic leaders. In analyzing the situation which developed at that time in the workers movement, Maurice Bishop noted that the CIA sometimes directly penetrated the leadership of certain trade unions and put it under CIA control.

As the struggle developed, the pseudo-leaders linked to the CIA were expelled; the workers rejected them and established firm, effective ties with the

progressive part of the trade union workers and the radically-inclined intelligentsia. Some of the urban organizations began to group themselves around the Movement of People's Assemblies, which was headed by Maurice Bishop. At the same time the movement entitled "United Campaign for Welfare, Education and Liberation" (abbreviated JEWEL) was organized in the rural areas. On 11 March 1973 the Movement of People's Assemblies and the JEWEL movement merged and began to be called in their united form the New JEWEL Movement.

Having declared itself to be an organization with a socialist orientation, the New JEWEL Movement headed the Grenadan revolutionary process. This ensured steady growth in the number of its supporters. The New JEWEL Movement, which was organized as a party of the vanguard, and which included the most tested fighters, who were guided by scientific revolutionary principles, tirelessly carried out work among the masses, work which was aimed at increasing the workers' revolutionary consciousness and at turning spontaneous protest into an organized struggle. It carried out propaganda which unmasked the system of tyrannical elitism, and which called for the establishment of that form of democratic rule which would provide for participation by the broad masses of the people in the management of society. The intensive work which JEWEL carried out in various forms, including parliamentary, legal, semi-legal and underground work, became the basis for the forward development of revolutionary forces and the formation of the subjective preconditions of revolution. The specific conditions of Grenada determined the transition of the New JEWEL Movement to tactics of armed insurrection. On 13 March 1979, at four in the morning, troops of the People's Revolutionary Army attacked the government barracks and seized weapons, ammunition and a radio station.

The bourgeois mass propaganda media attempted to downgrade the revolutionary significance of the people's uprising and to reduce it to the level of an ordinary military coup. But the events which began on 13 March disproved these conjectures. In the first place, the leaders of the uprising did not belong to the ranks of the military. It was no accident that dismissal of the old army was one of the first steps taken by the new revolutionary government. In the second place, the uprising did not result only in a personnel change within the ruling elite while the old political system was retained; instead, the previous state apparatus was completely destroyed, and a fundamentally new political structure was established in its place. In the third place, in contrast with classical military coups, the New JEWEL Movement did not count on introducing martial law, a curfew, etc. On the contrary, all Grenadans regardless of social differences and political views, were called up to protect the revolution. By arming the masses the revolution gained their political trust. The fact that the victory was firmly established within 24 hours is an indicator of the very widespread popularity of the revolutionary action methods used by the New JEWEL Movement.

Toward genuine democracy

In the area of domestic policy the first and most basic task of the Grenadan revolution was to establish conditions for the development of a new type of democracy. Toward this end the revolutionary leadership set out measures to

increase the level of the population's political activities. As Bernard Coard, deputy prime minister and a member of our party's Politburo, noted, the top-priority tasks included mobilizing, organizing and raising the political level of the entire people because profound social transformations are impossible without the broad, active participation of the popular masses.

Toward these ends the first few months following the victory of the uprising saw the adoption of laws to preserve all the basic human rights, which had previously been grievously violated in this country; in addition, new rights for the citizens of Grenada were proclaimed, rights which had never before been included in the legislation of the English-speaking Caribbean countries. They included the right to work, to housing and to education. The right of workers to join trade unions was re-established; before the revolution only 40 percent of workers were trade union members, who were often deprived of the opportunity to choose which trade union they wished to join, while now 90 percent of workers are trade union members. The workers right to assemble and to establish mass public organizations was also restored. Before the revolution, the country had no significant mass organizations except for the trade unions. Today, in addition to the new democratic trade unions, there is a National Women's Organization, which includes 26 percent of all women. Every eighth farmer is a member of the Alliance of Farmer Producers. A National Youth Organization includes 40 percent of young people from 14 to 20 years of age, and 80 percent of school children aged 6 to 14 are pioneers.

The democratization of the press and other mass information media has provided the community with the opportunity to express its opinion. Naturally this contributes to the process by which ever increasing numbers of Grenadans are being drawn into the active socio-political life of the country. The number of newspapers has grown sharply. While previously the country had only one newspaper, which largely reflected the interests of the land-holding elite, it now has nine papers, which provide broad representation of the opinions of the rank-and-file members of the mass organizations. A union of journalists has been established in Grenada. In this way the country's press is becoming a powerful ideological tool for the formation of the mass's revolutionary consciousness.

A mass campaign to combat illiteracy was started in the first years of the revolution in order to ensure that the masses would have opportunities for politically-conscious participation in the process of formulating and taking national decisions. Today there are practically no illiterates. Irrationalism and mysticism, which were typical of Grenada's spiritual life under the Gairy regime, have finally given way to the conscious principles of social practice. Undoubtedly this has strengthened the revolution's positions among the people; it has expanded its mass base and the ranks of the politically active majority.

The intelligentsia, which was formerly subjected to the persecutions of tyranny and forced emigration, today is a vitally important part of the revolution's moving forces. The recently established Union of Workers Engaged in Mental Labor is heading a program of activities to revive popular culture; during the period of the dictatorship the supporters of this culture were ridiculed and subjected to persecution. The revolution has opened up great

opportunities for the spiritual liberation of the masses' cultural potential. In this way it gained for itself a new field of endeavor. Today the revolution lives in poetry, songs, dances, plays and carnivals, all of which have received a powerful developmental stimulus.

At the head of all the mass organizations there is the vanguard party, the New JEWEL Movement, which enjoys the broad support of the masses and which possesses great political authority. In its ranks the party has the best representatives of the working class and its allies; over a certain period they have undergone an appropriate course of training and acquired knowledge and skill in working among the masses. Party life is based on the principle of democratic centralism. The highest party organ is the Central Committee, which selects the political and economic bureaux, which are headed by Maurice Bishop, chairman of the Central Committee. This structure for the directing organs of the party is in line with the tasks of developing the revolutionary process in the most effective way possible and of elevating the masses' creative initiative.

Of course, every success achieved by the Grenadan revolution provokes hostility from the imperialist circles, which have threatened more than once to strangle it. The imperialist intrigues against Grenada have been varied. Their main purpose was and remains the splitting of the country into two opposing camps. Imperialism is attempting to bring together the counterrevolutionary elements for political intrigues, for subversion of the New JEWEL Movement's position and in the final analysis for the purpose of overthrowing the revolutionary authority. There is evidence of this in recent events, during the course of which attempts were made to force Grenada to return to the "Westminster" parliamentary model of development. An answer to that was provided by Maurice Bishop, who emphasized that the principles of bourgeois British democracy and its corresponding institutions constituted for Grenada a developmental model which has become obsolete.

At the same time it should be noted that the initiators of the anti-Grenada campaign do not disdain other methods of exerting political pressure; they are not above making attempts on the lives of the country's leaders or spreading rumors about lack of trust in the government, etc. Nor are they weakening in their attempts to create an opposition group of land owners or to bring the church into the process of destabilizing the political positions of the revolutionary leadership.

Imperialism has also resorted to its favorite method--the use of mercenaries. With the aid of the most reactionary forces in the Caribbean, an incursion by a counterrevolutionary rabble onto Grenada was organized. On 19 June 1980 the counterrevolutionaries made an attempt at the physical destruction of the revolutionary leadership, an attempt which was supposed to end with acts of mass terror. During a speech by Maurice Bishop at a mass meeting before an audience of 20,000 people a powerful bomb was exploded beneath the platform on which the party leadership was seated; however, the terrorists did not achieve their goal. In response to this event the people rallied even more strongly around the party under the slogan "We will not be frightened!" More than 50,000 people took to the streets, making an unprecedentedly large

demonstration in support of the revolution. A crushing blow was dealt to the imperialist attempts.

In a radio appeal the prime minister emphasized the resolve of the entire people to defend the revolution, and he stated that at least 20,000 Grenadans, nearly 20 percent of the entire population, intended to join the ranks of the people's militia. The revolutionary army received new reinforcement in the form of people who vowed to defend the revolution to the last drop of blood. Having granted arms to the working class and its allies, the Grenadan revolution demonstrated firmness and its resolve to defend its gains.

The work of all the mass organizations, the militia, the trade unions, the women's, youth and farmers' organizations, has stimulated the development of new forms of democracy in the country. There is evidence of this phenomenon in volunteer labor--which is an integral feature of the revolutionary process in Grenada, and which reflects the masses' thirst for politically--conscious, historically-important creative work. In deciding who must work where, when and how, the people gather together and discuss collective questions which have arisen. As a result, the grass-roots structures for directing the initiative of the masses are formed directly in the course of the transforming activities themselves. This process helps to resolve in a natural manner the difficulties which sometimes arise along this path. At the present moment Grenada is in the process of developing democratic mechanisms for regulating the relations between labor collectives with regard to the distribution of raw materials, equipment, etc.

On this basis the system of the people's authority is growing ever stronger. The political and economic bureaus of the Central Committee support direct contact with the grass-roots party organizations, which are closely linked to the labor collectives, whose initiatives are coordinated through parish and zonal councils, and at the lowest level by communal groups. The communal zonal and parish councils, like the parish workers councils, have many functions. In particular, they are concerned with providing medical assistance for the population, distributing milk to children, as well as uniforms and textbooks for those in school, and with building communal centers and daycare facilities for the children of working mothers, etc. These same organs of the people's authority follow and monitor regularly the work of public sector employees who are responsible for the functioning of the power network, the water supply, education system, etc. They participate in the making of economic decisions on matters of the budget, national planning and the provision of employment.

This mechanism of management has led to the development of a system by which governing units report to the people; this is the first time this kind of system has been put into practice in the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean. In this way the principle that the institutions of authority are responsible for the fate of the nation and its developmental prospects has begun to operate.

In the light of all of the above changes it is becoming possible to evaluate the development of people's democracy in Grenada; it can be defined as a system which protects all the basic human rights (the right to work, to housing, to

education, to health care and to the satisfaction of cultural needs) and which ensures the forward development of our people.

The development of the economy--the pledge of future successes

In the area of economics the democratic participation by workers in the decision-making process is a key element of the revolutionary transformations. The essence of the noncapitalist development path which our country is following has been concisely formulated by Bernard Coard: "Our mixed economy includes, the state, private and cooperative sectors. The leading position in the economy will be taken by the state sector, which will also determine the process of development."

The state sector's leading role reflects the volume of capital investment which stipulated, for example, a growth rate of 68 percent for 1980-1981. On the other hand, during this same period capital investment in the private sector was reduced by 4 percent, and its total value amounted to less than 5 percent of capital investment in the state sector. The government of Grenada adopted the so-called "Capital Investment Code," which defines in a clear and precise form the conditions on which capital investment by local and foreign citizens is welcomed and encouraged.

There is even evidence of the outstanding success of the revolutionary government's policy in providing for the effectiveness of state enterprises to be found in a report by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development of August 1982 which says: "The present operations of a number of state enterprises and institutions, which caused concern in the prerevolutionary period, should be noticeably improved by 1982. In 1981 inadequacies in the work of the water supply commission were virtually eliminated... The National Trade Association, as well as the port authority, were profitable in 1981. Significantly fewer budget appropriations were required to assist the State Corporation of Farmers, as well as certain new state enterprises which were established in 1980-1981."

Today the production sector is used to benefit all social strata in our country. Its basic task is first to overcome economic backwardness, to ensure national independence and increase the working people's standard of living, and then to create the material, technical and economic preconditions for development along a socialistically oriented path.

It is no exaggeration to say that agriculture is the most important sector of Grenada's economy: it employs 40 percent of the work force and provides 30 percent of the gross national product. In the first three years of the revolution, state capital investment in agriculture grew 50-fold in comparison with the indicators for 1977. The number of cooperatives, which now constitute the basis for the development of socialist relations in agriculture, increased 20-fold. The fact that the National Commercial Bank is in the hands of the state contributes to a significant degree to the development of agriculture. In just the first two years following the revolution, 69 percent of the total amount of loans granted by the National Commercial Bank was channelled into this branch of the economy.

The industrialization program, which was developed with consideration for the utilization of local production resources, lies at the core of all important government undertakings. Along with the achievements in the area of agricultural development, this program is simultaneously providing a successful solution to the problem of employment. Before the revolution the unemployed constituted 49 percent of the work force, but by late 1982 unemployment had fallen to 14 percent, which is lower than the unemployment figures for all the other English-speaking Caribbean countries. By 1986 full employment will be ensured.

The government and the people have come closer together as a direct result of this economic policy. The population's needs are being satisfied to an ever greater degree. And this is not surprising. The volume of state capital investment has increased 12-fold in the four years of the people's power. As a result the gross national product grew by 2.1 percent in 1981. According to a report by the International Reconstruction and Development Bank Grenada was one of the very few Western hemisphere countries in which economic activity increased.

The party's economic policy is linked more and more closely to social measures. Specifically, the deputy prime minister has described in the following manner the tasks of worker participation in the work of improving the economy: "The mass organizations... must intervene in the production process and create special production committees, which should provide for the growth of workers' labor productivity... Our government is a government of the workers; it aspires toward the same goals and puts forward the same tasks as do all members of the progressive trade unions: to ensure that all workers have job stability, democracy and social well-being... The task which members of our trade unions face consists of cooperation with the management in the creation of production committees... as well as discipline committees, and committees on education and the development of competition."

The development of the processes, which have a socialist orientation puts forward as an absolute requirement the task of scientific planning for economic policy. At the present stage at least, the following are essential for this: a) strengthening the public sector in the area of industry, agriculture and finances; b) coordinating the planning of economic and social development; c) developing the practice of formulating long-term plans and d) creating the socio-economic mechanisms, which ensure their successful fulfillment.

This process is already taking place. And life itself proves its value. However, it is impossible to achieve in one jump all the goals which have been set. In order for economic development to move forward, it is important to work out a flexible and balanced approach to the problems of development. And Grenada is using precisely this kind of planned, scientifically-based approach. In 1982 the first economic development plan, which covered one year, was worked out; the broadest strata of the population participated in the preparation of this plan. The first three-year plan was adopted for the period 1983-1985, and the first five-year plan will begin in 1986. Consultations between the leadership of Grenada and the representatives of the socialist alliance countries played a substantial role in the formulation of these plans.

The process of the revolutionary transformations in Grenada has demonstrated that planning under conditions of a noncapitalist path of development and the existence of a mixed economy creates the opportunity for the implementation of innovative initiatives. They are essential because the implementation of Grenada's economic development plans is not possible without the use of foreign capital investment, which must be attracted. Grenada receives its basic currency income from tourism and the exporting of spices, cocoa and bananas. Traditionally these branches of the country's economy depend on Western markets, where Grenada's small, open economic system constantly encounters significant difficulties. The island's economic development is influenced by the fact that the medium-term predictions of Grenada's economic growth rates depend in large measure on the export of goods and services, and on the conditions of trade and the size of foreign exchange assets which the country may attract in the form of technology, state grants, subsidies, loans and private capital investment. The position is also complicated by the lack of specialists, including those capable of developing plans and implementing their fulfillment.

It is for precisely this reason that the revolution has undertaken to carry out an intensive program of professional training and retraining, in the course of which leading personnel are raising the level of their specialized as well as their economic knowledge. As a result Grenada has succeeded in training within a short period of time the necessary number of specialists; it has also established a statistical service, which did not exist previously and which is becoming the basis for the planning of the economy.

It is interesting to note that the intensive program for raising the educational and cultural level of the population in general, and of the government apparatus employees in particular, has much in common with the experience of the Soviet Union, especially in the Central Asian republics. In making creative use of achievements in the area of planning, Grenada is already using the balance method successfully. Thanks to the increased use of statistical and other analytical instruments, our specialists are now able to solve complex economic problems and determine the most important parameters for the development of production and consumption of the basic goods and services. Of course, this process has only just begun. We still have a lot to learn and much to improve. However, with the aid of the planning organizations in the socialist countries, and especially in the Soviet Union, we are satisfying our thirst for knowledge.

It is no accident that even the representatives of the Western banking services, the experts of the International Monetary Fund and observers who hold very diverse views agree that in four years the economy of Grenada has achieved significant successes. This is especially noticeable in the sphere of public services. Free education and medical services constitute a significant achievement. Today assets obtained from the introduction of state control over the importing of the basic consumer goods, and over prices and incomes, are used for the social needs of the broad strata of the population. All this provides evidence that Grenada is the first English-speaking Caribbean country to begin restructuring the system for the distribution and redistribution of the GNP, a system which has a fundamental effect on the entire structure of socio-political relations.

The Grenadan revolution is a component of the world revolutionary process, which began with the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. When speaking about the role of the Soviet Union as a beacon in the liberation struggle, M. Bishop, the prime minister of Grenada, in particular, noted: "It is an historical fact that a revolutionary situation developed in many parts of the world as a result of the USSR victory over Nazi Germany. This historic achievement shook to the foundation the cornerstone of imperialism's might and abundance--the colonial system of dependence and exploitation. This gave rise to a kind of chain reaction, which brought millions of people into the struggle to do away with colonialism. All the peoples of the former colonies must truly feel gratitude for the firm and principled support which the Soviet people give to the cause of the struggle against colonialism, racism, neocolonialism and poverty..."

"Of course, without the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, it would have been incomparably more difficult to achieve the victory of the Grenadan revolution."

After the 1979 victory Grenada embarked firmly on a path--which had been chosen previously by revolutionary forces--oriented toward socialism. The advantages of the new path are manifested not only in the improvement of the people's material well-being in general, but also in the psychological sphere, which determines the actions of a free people.

Based on the experience of the socialist countries, the New JEWEL Movement party has strengthened its positions among the masses. Popular support is manifested not only in the public's active participation in mass organizations but also in its constant willingness to be drawn into the process of political and economic decision making. For example, between December 1981 and February 1982, 80 percent of the adult population participated through various organizations in the discussion of the 1982 budget and the first national plan. In 1982-1983 similar processes continue to develop.

It is precisely this very broad participation by the masses which strengthens and increases the significance of the revolution's main directions: national mobilization and the raising of political consciousness, national defense, the economy and international relations. All these problems constitute the essence of our revolution's daily work.

And the essence of the Grenadan people's struggle also lies here. From the very beginning a characteristic feature of the struggle has been the aspiration toward maximal unity. In the period of resistance to the Gairy tyranny everyone who was in opposition was drawn into the struggle. The uprising was an act of the people's will, and all strata of the population took part in it. All patriots can participate in the revolutionary process. As the minister of national mobilization said: "It is only because our people were drawn in a democratic manner into the work of preparing the uprising that they became direct participants in the revolutionary process, and, moreover, this participation level is growing from day to day."

And the prime minister pointed out that the unity of the people is the best response to the imperialist threat to revolution: "The common response (of

all revolutions to imperialist aggression, R.J.) is unity: the internal unity of our people and the international unity of all the forces which are striving for peace, democracy, social progress and national liberation."

Thus the revolutionary process in Grenada confirms the following well-known tenets: the development of the revolutionary process in each country takes its own path; the existence of a monolithic vanguard party, organized on the basis of scientific principles is a necessary precondition for the successful development of the revolution; the defense of the revolutionary gains and the further consolidation of the revolutionary forces is impossible unless revolutionary ideals are instilled in the population's consciousness; unity at both the national and international levels is a very important factor in the defense of the revolution; the rate and direction of revolutionary transformations depends on the specific factors of world-wide development; a socialist orientation is a reliable way to overcome socio-economic backwardness quickly and, finally, the organized popular masses are the creator of the revolution.

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LATIN AMERICA INSTITUTE RESEARCH WORK IN 1981-1982 SUMMARIZED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 83 pp 138-140

/Article by O.N. Papkov: "Basic Results of Scientific-Research Activities of the Institute of Latin America in 1981-1982"/

/Text/ The most significant result of the creative activities by the ILA /Institute of Latin America/ collective in the first two years of the 11th Five-Year Plan was the publication of the second volume of the two-volume encyclopedic reference work entitled "Latinskaya Amerika," which was prepared jointly with the "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya" /Soviet Encyclopedia/ Publishing House (editor-in-chief--V.V. Vol'skiy, Moscow, 1982, 656 pages, 24 line drawings and 3 line maps). This brought to an end the work--which extended over a period of many years--on this collective effort, resulting in this encyclopedia-type publication, which is the first in the world to be so vast in its subject matter and yet so small in size. It contains information on the diverse natural conditions and resources of the region's countries, the histories of their peoples, socio-economic paths and their political and cultural development from ancient times to the present day.

The first year of the 11th Five-Year Plan went down in our country's history as the year of the 26th CPSU Congress, and for the ILA it was also an anniversary year: 28 April 1981 was the 20th anniversary of the institute's founding. In conjunction with this date the publication entitled "Sovetskaya latinoamerikanistika posle pobedy kubinskoy revolyutsii" /Soviet Latin American Studies Following the Victory of the Cuban Revolution/ (Moscow, ILA USSR Academy of Sciences, 1981, 380 pages) was prepared and put out. The development of Soviet Latin American studies was summarized in this work.

The collective work is the basis of all scientific research carried out at the Institute. It is the collective work which has made it possible to concentrate the efforts of scientific research associates on the most important directions, subjects and problems, and to resolve within relatively short time periods complex tasks in the generalization, systematization and analysis of vast factual material.

As before, the scholars have continued to focus their attention on the discovery of those features which are characteristic of the Latin American countries in general by virtue of a certain commonality in their historical destinies; they continue to determine the general and the specific in the development of the region's countries. At the same time research on particular countries has also been carried out. However, the creation of comprehensive and fundamental scientific works devoted to the urgent economic, social and political problems of present-day Latin America remains the institute's main task in the 11th Five-Year Plan.

As in previous years Cuba remains the number one subject among the investigations devoted to particular countries, with works on the patterns and experience of socialist construction in Cuba, the formation of the material-technical base of socialism, and the economic and socio-political development of the socialist Republic of Cuba. Soviet specialists carry out joint work with scholars from Cuba and the GDR. The creative cooperation of Soviet scholars from ILA, the USSR Ministry of Defense's Institute of Military History and scholars from the Center for Military History of the Cuban Revolutionary Forces resulted in the book "Muzhestvo i bratstvo" [Courage and Fraternity] (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1980, 240 pages).¹ Cuban and Soviet specialists prepared a collection entitled "Playa-Khiron: istoricheskoye znachenie i uroki" [Playa Giron: Historical Significance and Lessons] (Moscow, USSR Academy of Sciences ILA, 1982, 108 pages).²

One of the basic directions in the scientific work of the ILA involves the study of the fundamental problems of the state and development of the capitalist economy of the Latin American countries. The publication of a collective monograph entitled "Promyshlennoye razvitiye stran Latinskoy Ameriki v usloviyakh NTR" [The Industrial Development of the Latin American Countries Under Conditions of the Scientific and Technical Revolution] (Moscow, "Nauka," 1981, 336 pages).³

It is well known that the food problem has become one of the most important socio-economic issues of the present day. A collective monograph entitled "Prodoval'stvennaya problema i sel'skoye khozyaystvo stran Latinskoy Ameriki" [The Food Problem and Agriculture in the Latin American Countries] (Moscow, "Nauka," 1981, 311 pages)⁴ was devoted to an examination of the ways in which this problem can be resolved in the Latin American countries.

For a long time Latin America has been an arena of acute inter-imperialist rivalry. Using neocolonialist methods, the imperialist states exploit the countries of this region. The problems of inter-imperialist conflicts are the subject of a monograph by Yu.N. Paniyev "Ekonomicheskiye otnosheniya stran Latinskoy Ameriki s EES" [The Economic Relations of the Latin American Countries and the EEC], (Moscow, "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1982, 168 pages).⁵

As before the study of the socio-economic and political development of individual countries in Latin America and their role in the world economy and world politics occupies an important place in the current five-year plan. Within the framework of this direction, the preparation of a series of collective

works devoted to particular countries has continued through the joint efforts of several sectors of ILA. The book "Peru: sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoye i politicheskoye razvitiye (1968-1980)" [Peru: Socio-Economic and Political Development (1968-1980)] (Moscow, "Nauka," 1982, 296 pages), was published in this series of investigations: it contains an examination of the country's most recent history, and specifically of those years in which structural transformations were carried out here. A large portion of the work is taken up with an analysis of Peru's economic development problems, its domestic and foreign policy, the position of the civilian government which came to power in 1980, as well as with an investigation of the reasons for the changes in the military's policies in the second half of the 70's.

Study of the countries in the Andes group and "Mezo-America" has been continued on the basis of the methodology worked out for comprehensive, problem-oriented, area studies. Much attention has been devoted to present-day processes which are taking place in the socio-economic, political and ideological spheres of these countries, as well as to the role which they play in world economics and politics. A collection has been prepared under the title "Andskiye strany: opyt bor'by za progressivnyy kurs razvitiya. (Trudnosti i protivorechiya)" [The Andes Countries: the Experience of the Struggle for a Progressive Course of Development. (Difficulties and Conflicts)] (Moscow, USSR Academy of Sciences ILA, 1982, 180 pages), and a joint collective work by scientific research associates from ILA and the geography department of Moscow State University has been completed. It is entitled "Voprosy ekonomicheskoy i politicheskoy geografii zarubezhnykh stran" [Question of the Economic and Political Geography of Overseas Countries] (No 4, Moscow, USSR Academy of Sciences ILA, 1982, 201 pages).

The collective work entitled "Latinskaya Amerika: regional'naya politika i planirovaniye" [Latin America: Regional Politics and Planning] (Moscow, "Nauka," 1982, 206 pages) contains an examination of the reasons for the emergence, as well as the content, the mechanism, forms, methods and results of regional politics and planning. A special chapter is devoted to the study of the experience gained in regional planning by the socialist Republic of Cuba, as well as its international significance and opportunities for Soviet-Latin American cooperation in this sphere.

In the institute's scholarly work serious attention is devoted to the investigation and analysis of the problems of the communist and workers movement on the continent in general and in individual countries; attention is also given to the study of the general features and characteristic aspects of the communist parties' strategy and tactics, as well as to their role and place in the development of the liberation and revolutionary movement in their own countries and in the international communist movement. Also under study is the struggle for unity in the continent's communist and workers movement. Joint efforts by a large author's collective of institute associates and scholars from other scientific and educational institutions resulted in the publication of a book entitled "Kommunisticheskiye partii Latinskoy Amerika" [The Communist Parties of Latin America] (Moscow, "Nauka," 1982, 368 pages).⁶

The institute's scholarly investigations have begun to reflect the more concentrated attention which is being devoted to the treatment of problems related to the analysis of the political systems in the Latin American countries. The collective work entitled "Politicheskaya sistema obshchestva v Latinskoy Amerike" [The Political System of Society in Latin America] (Moscow, "Nauka," 1982, 477 pages) contains an analysis of the socio-economic factors and the class forces, which determine the historical typology of social and state institutions and the regimes in these states. Particular attention is devoted to such issues as the crisis of the traditional systems and alternatives for social development.

The fruit of the collective work by scholars from the USSR, the Polish People's Republic, the GDR and CSSR can be seen in the jointly written "Vneshnaya politika stran Latinskoy Ameriki" [Foreign Policy of the Latin American Countries] (Moscow, "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya," 1982, 304 pages). The book "Latinskaya Amerika: problemy vooruzheniy i razoruzheniya" [Latin America: Problems of Arms and Disarmament] (Moscow, "Nauka," 1982, 136 pages).⁸

In 1981-1982, as in the 10th Five-Year Plan, there was comprehensive study of the Latin American countries, the influence of cultural processes on social and political life, problems of education and the training of skilled personnel, the provision of specialists for various branches of the national economy, the analysis of ideological currents and the political struggle in the sphere of education. The book "Kul'tura Brazili" [The Culture of Brazil] (Moscow, "Nauka," 1981, 272 pages)⁹ belongs in this category.

In addition to the above-mentioned works, 1981-1982 saw the publication of the following collections and individual, non-plan works by institute associates: "Sovetsko-meksikanskiye otnosheniya (1917-1980). Sbornik dokumentov" [Soviet-Mexican Relations (1917-1980). A Collection of Documents] (Moscow, "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya," 1981, 112 pages),¹⁰ the collections "Molodyye gosudarstva Karibskogo basseyana: problemy razvitiya" [Young States of the Caribbean: Problems of Development] (Moscow, USSR Academy of Sciences ILA, 1981, 180 pages),¹¹ "Latinskaya Amerika protiv imperializma" [Latin America Against Imperialism] (Moscow, USSR Academy of Sciences ILA, 1982, 195 pages),¹² the collection "Podvig Simona Bolivara" [The Heroic Deeds of Simon Bolivar] (Moscow, USSR Academy of Sciences ILA, 1982, 127 pages), a monograph by A.I. Sizonenko "Stanovleniye otnosheniya SSSR so stranami Latinskoy Ameriki (1917-1945)" [The Establishment of USSR Relations with the Latin American Countries (1917-1945)] (Moscow, "Nauka," 1981, 200 pages)¹³ and a work by S.N. Kosobchuk on translating into Russian, "Sovremennaya ekonomicheskaya terminologiya ispanoyazychnykh stran" [Current Economic Terminology of the Spanish-Speaking Countries] (Moscow, "Nauka," 1982, 144 pages).

FOOTNOTES

1. For a review of the book see: LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 4, 1983.
2. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 2, 1983.
3. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 8, 1982.

4. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 2, 1983.
5. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 3, 1983.
6. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 3, 1983.
7. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 4, 1983,
8. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 9, 1982.
9. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 6, 1982.
10. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 3, 1982.
11. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 6, 1982
12. This book contains an analysis of the economic and political problems of the continent's countries, as well as an examination of the forms of the struggle against imperialism. A significant amount of attention is devoted to the activities of foreign capital in Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, Peru, Guatemala and other countries in this region.
13. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 2, 1982.

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BOOK SEES 'CRISIS' IN WESTERN THEORIES OF THIRD-WORLD DEVELOPMENT

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 83 pp 141-144

/Review by I.V. Aleshina of book "Krizis burzhuaznykh teoriy razvitiya osvobodivshikhsya stran" /The Crisis in the Bourgeois Theories about the Development of the Liberated Countries/ by V.M. Kollontay, "Mysl'," Moscow, 1982, 174 pages

/Text/ Theories about the development of the liberated countries constitute one of the youngest sub-disciplines in Western social sciences; it is one which arose when the colonial system of imperialism was breaking up, and now, after a 30-year evolution, it is dramatically finishing its "first round": its basic hypotheses and ideas have come under the fire of harsh criticism first in the developing countries and then in the West as well. At the present moment Western theoreticians are searching for a new ideological-theoretical approach; they are reviewing their concepts, which "do not work" now. A process of adaptation and re-examination also took place previously, in the 60's and 70's, but the current situation is qualitatively different from that one, which was characterized by a conventional "paradigm shift." The author of the book under review accurately describes this situation as a "crisis," and shows convincingly its fundamental dissimilarity to the regular process by which ideas are changed and renewed; he reveals the causes of the crisis and its essence, as well as the specific features of the ideological-theoretical struggle in this area at the present time.

In the most general understanding, a crisis in social thought is a collapse of old ideological-theoretical dogmas which results when their groundlessness has been revealed. The most obvious sign of such a collapse is to be seen when the most jealous defenders and propagandists of these dogmas reject them. Today this sign of crisis is present; the author shows convincingly the irreversibility of the "renunciation" process and describes the "inheritance" which Western theoreticians have been forced to reject. The basic credo of its creators, including W. Rostow and a multitude of prominent economists and sociologists, was that the solution to the problems of the liberated countries was to be found in the repetition of the Western "experience of development" to be achieved by accelerating economic growth. Herein lies the essence of Western social thought's "Euro-centrism."

There are several reasons why this sub-discipline has been driven into the depths of crisis and they are extremely varied in nature: they are economic and social, methodological and gnosiological, class and political; they have become interwoven into one tight knot, which keeps Western social sciences concerning the liberated countries in a dead end. The author stimulates the reader's interest in certain reasons for the crisis, primarily by pointing out the ways in which the theories are inadequate to the real process. The very idea of "catch-up development" is in its essence a simplified theoretical construction, which ignores the uniqueness of the socio-economic structure and genetic characteristics of society in these countries. Now it is already obvious that their development (including the development of states which are experiencing capitalist evolution) has been marked by those features which exclude the possibility of repeating the "Western way."

The second reason for the crisis lies in the groundlessness of the recipes offered for the resolution of difficult and complex problems of development as much as in the interpretation of those problems. The proponents of the theory counted on the acceleration of economic growth; in the years of political independence the liberated countries achieved this, but the basic problems of development remain acute. The accelerated growth of an economy which is undergoing a capitalist transformation is accompanied everywhere by grave social consequences; it turns into the emergence of a multi-million army of poor and unfortunate people, who have been cast overboard by society. The automatic overcoming of economic backwardness did not take place, and the imperialist dependence of these countries was not eliminated.

✓ The reader's attention is also directed to a reason for the crisis in Western development theory, a reason which at first glance seems purely methodological in nature, but which in reality is profoundly related to the gnosiological roots and class essence of these theories. The problem was that up to now Western theoreticians have limited their analysis to the economic sphere, at a time when the disciplines which study other aspects of the process of social development--sociology and history, social ethnography and anthropology--were being developed in isolation. When the need to increase inter-disciplinary research grew as a result of the complexity of this process and became the order of the day, Western social sciences proved to be a mechanical aggregate of a multitude of disciplines. The flaw in the very foundation of Western science has now been discovered: the lack of a common methodological basis, the lack of a common world view which would provide the foundation for interdisciplinary research. Western concepts and theories of development were brought together on the only possible basis--their subordination to imperialism, from which flowed their Euro-centrism, the aspiration to preserve the "status quo" in the liberated countries and to organize their development "according to their own image." But it is precisely this basis for the theories which is rejected in the liberated countries.

Also, the general situation in the sphere of the ideological-theoretical struggle has changed fundamentally: the alignment of forces is in favor of socialism; Marxism enjoys high prestige, and there is growing significance in the internal factors in the life of the developing countries, which are coming forward with demands for changes in the international economic order.

A new trend grew up in Mon-Marxist social science itself: the liberated states produced their own theoreticians, who could look at the process of development not from the viewpoint of imperialism's interests, but from the positions of their own countries. They see more deeply and fully the obstacles and problems which stand in the way of overcoming backwardness and dependence. The specific features of the ideological-theoretical struggle in this area of social science lies in the fact that this struggle has been unleashed not only between Marxist and bourgeois thought; it is also taking place within non-Marxist thought itself, thus revealing even more sharply the groundlessness of Western approaches.

V.M. Kollontay uses a great deal of material to show that the initiative in the search for new approaches both in the area of interpreting the internal development processes and in the area of theory with regard to international economic relations belongs to the theoreticians of the developing states. They are attempting to take into account the specific features of their own countries, and the uniqueness of the development processes, and, of course, they take note of the dependent nature of this development. When the West attempted to "seize" the initiative in the attack against the old theories, the "realism" introduced by the theoreticians in the liberated countries was energetically exploited.

In particular, this is what happened to the concept of dependence. Until recently there was generally silence in the West with regard to the factor of dependence, as if this phenomenon did not exist, and only now, after it has become the focus of concentrated attention in the works of theoreticians from the liberated countries, especially those in Latin America, that a special direction in social thought has been formulated to study the problems of dependence. But they are now attempting to push the concepts which have emerged in this area into the direction of neocolonialism's interests.

The bulk of the attention in this book is focused on a description of the new ideas which are being discussed in the West. The author of the book under review has brought them together in two groups, which represent concepts which differ in terms of their approaches and problems: "alternative development" and the restructuring of the international economic relations. In the process of critically examining the concepts of "alternative development" the author shows their close link with the traditional theoretical apparatus of bourgeois political economy and sociology, and specifically with the theories of "industrial society." He notes that the concepts of alternative development have inherited from the "industrialist" of the first and second generations all of their basic flaws: bourgeois objectivism in the interpretation of societal processes, an innumerable multitude of utopic illusions which they sow, assuming that in the course of development in the liberated countries it is possible to "cut out" the bad aspects of "industrial," that is, capitalist society.

At the same time the treatment of problems related to satisfaction of the public's basic needs and the means of technical progress (such as the choice of technology), all of which are acute problems for these countries, is consistently subordinated to the interests of the West. Specifically, the idea of the

"basic needs" is set against the problem of restructuring international economic relations (although it is already obvious that this has been unsuccessful), and the problem of choosing technology is replaced by a panegyric to Western technology and small-scale production (the latter is left as a sphere for the application of national capital, while large-scale production is reserved for foreign enterprise). These theoretical positions are by no means new; they are behind even capitalist practice, and it is no accident that within Western literature itself there have appeared misgivings that theoretical backwardness threatens to turn against the future interests of capitalism.

Western theoreticians have no genuine alternatives to replace their own old approach; their "new" concepts in essence are not a search for ways to resolve problems and provide for the genuine developmental interests of the group of countries under consideration: instead, they are a contradictory "cramming" of truly important problems into the decrepit philosophy of "catch up development." The author also points out the vulnerable aspects of the concepts of "alternative development," which have arisen in the liberated countries themselves: they are a not always correctly understood originality, the preaching of asceticism and egalitarianism, and frequently a complete denial of scientific and technical progress. All these weaknesses result from the impossibility of finding a genuine alternative to development along the lines of traditionalism or capitalism.

The evolution of thought in the second group of concepts, which concern the restructuring of international economic relations took place through an attempt to adapt the ideas of classical bourgeois political economy concerning the comparative advantages of countries participating in world trade to the old colonial model of the international division of labor. The above-mentioned crisis in this model, like the unity of actions manifested by the liberated countries in the mid-70's, forced the West to search for a theoretical counterweight here, too. This role was fulfilled by the concept of "interdependence," which has served as the ideological-theoretical tool of imperialism in recent years. The author shows how the practice of imperialism, and specifically the protectionist policy of the developed capitalist countries with regard to the liberated states, has led this new concept into a dead end as well. In the developing countries this concept has been opposed by the idea of the restructuring of the international economic order. At the same time many theoreticians in the liberated countries find it difficult to search for a genuinely ideological-theoretical alternative. Given the differentiation and delimitation of the capitalistically-developed countries there arises the task of strengthening the unity of actions in the struggle for the restructuring of the international economic order, while the formulation of a democratic alternative to the imperialist interpretation of the world capitalist economy acquires particular significance.

The book takes up an enormous layer of the literature in the area of the Western social sciences, and it contains a detailed examination of the contradictions and dead ends in the theoretical search taking place under changed conditions. However, the critical analysis is not carried out with equal thoroughness in all places: there is still much to be done in improving the

scientific classification of theories: the problems are so new and still so unsettled that this is not an easy task by any means. But it is obvious that the reader will benefit from reading this specialized monograph in the complex area of the critical analysis of non-Marxist thought.

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TIMOFEYEV ON PROGRESS OF SOCIALISM

Moscow RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNY MIR in Russian No 3, May-Jun 83 pp 13-26

[Article by T. T. Timofeyev: "Marxism and the Progress of Socialism"]

[Excerpts] In March of 1983 a conference organized by the CPUSA's theoretical journal POLITICAL AFFAIRS was held in New York on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the death of Karl Marx. It was participated in by prominent figures in the American workers movement and Marxist scholars from other countries.

The present article by USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member T. T. Timofeyev is based on his paper at that conference. The papers and reports of a number of other participants are scheduled to be published in subsequent issues of our journal.

This year we observe a number of remarkable dates symbolizing important milestones in the development of the world workers movement, the struggle of the broad masses of the workers against exploitation, militarism, and national oppression, for genuine social progress and peace. Above all, it is the 165th anniversary of the birth of the great founder of scientific socialism Karl Marx, and the 100th anniversary of his death. This summer, at the end of July and the beginning of August, we will mark the 80th anniversary of the holding of the Second RSDRP Party--the 80th anniversary of bolshevism, which as a current in political thought and as a political party has existed since 1903. Between these memorable dates there is a continuity and an organic connection. Creatively developing and applying revolutionary theory to conditions of the 20th century, V. I. Lenin and the Leninists put Marx's ideas into practice.

Since the moment of its advent, the Bolshevik Party, as is emphasized in the CPSU Central Committee decree "The 80th Anniversary of the Second RSDRP Congress," differed fundamentally from the parties of the Second Internationale, which were not capable of revolutionary action. It was guided and is guided by Marxist-Leninist teaching, ensuring organic unity between revolutionary theory and practice, constantly studying and utilizing the experience of the international communist movement, systematically implementing the principles of proletarian internationalism. Armed with the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, it spearheaded the liberation struggle of the proletariat and its allies

in the three Russian revolutions and led the working masses to the triumph of October.

The victory of the Great October Revolution and the creation of the world socialist system resulted primarily from the realization of the ideas of Marx and Lenin in practice, from the remarkable scientific foresight that was characteristic of their works, a triumph of the ideas of scientific socialism.

In the course of socialist construction, the creative, constructive potential of the working class is manifested with special clarity and is growing more and more. Its impact on the course of social processes is becoming ever stronger.

Under socialism, for example, its role as the intellectual motive force of all social progress grows enormously; moreover, revolutionary theory is systematically enriched with new conclusions and postulates. "It is socialism," as CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Yu. V. Andropov has remarked, "which does away with age-old barriers separating labor and culture, creating a high-strength union of workers, peasants, members of the intelligentsia, and all workers of physical and mental labor, under the leadership of the working class. It impels the working masses toward achievements in science and technology, literature and the arts...."¹

At the same time, the principles of the collectivist morality of the working class are becoming vastly more widespread in the new society than ever before, principles based on the working people's age-old striving toward social equality and social justice. Under socialism they are being assimilated by increasingly greater masses of the working people and being realized in the practice of socialist construction, and many of them are taking on the force of law. This, naturally, strengthens the position of the working class as the moral motive force in processes of the revolutionary renewal of society.

Under socialism, the working class's opportunity to be the "physical executor" of this renewal is also becoming much stronger: it is the main productive force and at the same time the leading social-political force in society.

The growth of such opportunities is due primarily to the accelerated economic development of countries which have started on the path of socialist transformations as well as the corresponding rise in the number of workers and their share in the population of these countries. The industrialization of these countries enhances the working class's role in the economy, while the concentration of a substantial portion of the workers in large and very large industrial enterprises promotes even greater growth of their organization and collectivism.

Industrialization, followed by transition to the stage of scientific-industrial production, does more than merely multiply the ranks of the working class. This tendency in social-economic development also fosters enhancement of its position of leadership in socialist society, enabling it

to carry out grandiose programs of restructuring the whole way of life of the masses of the people on principles of general collectivism.

It should be emphasized that the creative capabilities of the working class are due not only to the objective course of the historical process. To realize these objective prerequisites, great importance attaches to the working class's subjective readiness for the role of creator of new forms of life. In the form of a brief aphorism this postulate was formulated by K. Marx, who wrote that the number of workers "...decides matters only when the masses are involved in organization and guided by knowledge."² Of great importance in strengthening this subjective factor is the activity of the most conscious segment of the working class--the vanguard. It raises the consciousness of the workers to the level of the perception of Marxism, thereby fostering the realization of most of the working people of their fundamental interests and goals.³

It should be kept in mind that a turnaround in property relations by itself does not do away with all the negative traits of the human community, which have been accumulated over the centuries. It is obvious, therefore, that full social equality does not come all at once and fully formed. Society takes some time to rise to that level, with difficulties and at the price of great effort. Progress toward full social equality, toward communist forms of distribution, constitute a lengthy and multilevel process consisting of a series of stages. Each one is distinguished by various opportunities to move forward, to implement in practice programs to create maximally favorable conditions for the all-round development of all members of society.

As is well-known, the historical approach to the analysis of humanity's socialist future enabled K. Marx and F. Engels to reveal the necessity at first of a transition period from the old society to the new, to determine the class nature of the state corresponding to this period. On that same basis they presented an even longer-range social forecast: the main aspect in it comprises teachings concerning the two phases of the development of the new, communist society: socialism and communism. V. I. Lenin not only generalized the teachings of K. Marx and F. Engels concerning the two phases of communist formation--he developed them further.

Creatively continuing and enriching revolutionary theory on the basis of Marxist teachings, he specifically examined the differences between the initial and the highest phases of the new society. The point, of course, was to resolve the problem in compact form. It is revealed in all its fullness only as socialist society becomes developed and strengthened in practice, as its capabilities are more fully realized.

Following Marx, Lenin viewed the birth of a new society out of the old as a natural-historical process which, after the socialist revolution, acquired the qualitative characteristic that it ceased to be random in nature and began to an increasing extent to be determined by the scientifically organized, goal-directed activities of the masses. Shortly before the October Revolution he wrote: "We do not pretend that Marx or the Marxists know the path to socialism in all its specifics. That is nonsense. We know the direction of

the path, we know what class forces lead along it, but the practical specifics will be revealed only by the experience of the millions, once they get down to business."⁴ V. I. Lenin understood clearly that after laying down the foundations of socialism the new structure would attain increasingly greater maturity and arrive at a state which he designated by the terms "developed socialist society," "mature socialism," and so on.

During V. I. Lenin's life, as we know, the Bolshevik Party focused its attention chiefly on practical solutions to the problems of the transition period and the initial stage of the struggle to build a socialist society. The entire path traversed by the USSR and the other socialist countries attests that in the later stages of its development as well socialism requires precise and comprehensive self-knowledge. The most important component is an understanding of the specific stages of the further growth of the new society after its foundations are laid down and consolidated.

Heightened interest in this series of problems is also evoked by the fact that we can state with greater substantiation than before that socialism as such (after the end of the transition period) represents a relatively lengthy stage of development of the new society in the process of its ultimate conversion to a communist society.

The concept of developed socialism demonstrates the dialectical unity of both the genuine successes in socialist construction, in accomplishing the many tasks of the first phase of the new society, the increasingly stronger growths of the communist future, and the still-unresolved problems left over from preceding stages of historical development. "What we need," Yu. V. Andropov has remarked in this connection, "is to realize soberly where we are. To jump ahead is to set up tasks which cannot be accomplished; to stand only on what we have achieved is to fail to utilize everything we possess. To see our society in its real dynamics, with all its capabilities and needs --this is what we require now."⁵

At the stage of developed socialism, the level of socialized economy is raised substantially higher. This is facilitated by the drawing together of the state (of all the people) and kolkhoz-cooperative forms of socialist ownership. This process of socialization of labor and production is developing now under the influence of profound shifts in the structure and character of productive forces (in the form, for example, of transition to scientific-industrial production). Under conditions of the new social structure, however, this process is developing--in contrast to capitalism (and this is essential!)--on the basis of socialist socialization of property. This kind of "socialization in deed" as V. I. Lenin wrote, strengthens the organic link of all groups of workers not only within an enterprise but also on a whole regional, sectorial, or national economic scale.

Under mature socialism, the overall sociocultural situation also changes substantially. This is very important for the further development of the whole system of social relations in the new society. The Soviet people progressed quite rapidly from semiliteracy (and in some cases, especially on the

formerly backward national fringes of tsarist Russia, very real illiteracy) to elementary levels of education and from there to even higher levels of education.

Under mature socialism, a vital role is played by the intelligentsia, whose ranks have been filled to a large extent from among workers and peasants. It is a very rapidly growing detachment of Soviet workers. Over the past 4 decades, the number of specialists with a higher or secondary specialized education has risen by more than 23 times in industry and 29 times in agriculture. Today the intelligentsia constitutes about 30 percent of the employed population in the Soviet Union.⁶ Professions involved in intellectual labor have become truly massive. In addition, a growing segment of the intelligentsia is employed along with workers in the same production collectives, where the labor of specialists and other workers employed in mental labor, as well as all other characteristics of their productive endeavors, is objectively acquiring an industrial, collectivist character. It is worth noting that according to 1980 data more than 52 percent of all highly qualified Soviet specialists were employed in sectors of material production.⁷

Also of great importance is socialism's experience in resolving the national question. Karl Marx pointed out the organic link between the social structure and its approach to national, racial problems. In order that the interests of the various nations and peoples "...might be shared," he wrote, "existing property relations must be eliminated, for the existing property relations foster the exploitation of some peoples by others...."⁸ The Soviet nations' experience, accumulated since the Great October Revolution and the development of history's first multinational socialist state, has convincingly confirmed the correctness of this position. In a comparatively short historical period, not only has political equality been secured but the economic and cultural backwardness of the national borderlands that were included in the former tsarist empire has been liquidated. For example, the production of industrial goods in a number of the union republics has risen by hundreds of times in that period.

Under developed socialism, the workers have become the largest and most numerous group of the population in all the union republics. National cadres of the intelligentsia have developed. The actual facts of Soviet history, therefore, demonstrate again and again that under socialism "national divisiveness and all forms of racial and national inequality and oppression have become a thing of the past" along with social-class antagonisms.⁹

Thus, as a result of the drawing together of various forms of socialist ownership, the increased level of socialization of labor and production, the gradual disappearance of essential differences between intellectual and physical labor, and the conversion of all workers to the ideological-political positions of the working class, to the scientific, Marxist-Leninist world view, the real interests, goals, social ideals, and psychology of the various segments of the Soviet population have also grown closer together. At the same time, this rapprochement is combined with retention of the uniqueness and originality of the national cultures, their genuine flourishing.

One of the most graphic manifestations of Soviet society's progress toward ever-greater social equality for all its members is the increasingly fundamental confirmation of collectivism in all spheres of life as the most characteristic feature of genuine socialism, reflecting the essence of its social relations and the moral principles governing people's behavior. Collectivism entails a unity and community of interests, subordinating personal and group interests to social interests, comradeship, and mutual aid in all spheres of life. The principles of the new, collectivist morality began to be consolidated and developed soon after the victory of the socialist revolution. With the liquidation of private property, the working class laid down the social-economic and social-political foundations for the rise of this collectivism, in which, as K. Marx and F. Engels wrote, the working people establish their control "...over both the conditions of their existence and the conditions of existence of all members of society: in this collectivism individuals take part as individuals."¹⁰

One indispensable aspect of collectivism under developed socialism is the workers' broad participation in administering production and society. The key role here is assigned to the working class; this reflects, in particular, its leading place in society. Participation in administration includes a broad range of activities: the workers' personal participation in ensuring effective functioning of production, participation in organs of administration of production and society on all levels, and so on.

Self-government in the labor collective expresses a most essential aspect of the socialist nature of administration. Extensive enlistment of the working people in the administration of production constitutes a condition on enhancing the effective functioning of the economic mechanism. Surveys conducted in various regions of the USSR and in labor collectives of varying makeup show that the overwhelming majority of the working people consider participation in the administration of production and society not only a right but a duty.

At the same time, "...a perception of self-government which tends toward anarcho-syndicalism, toward fragmentation of society into competing corporations not dependent on one another, toward democracy without discipline, toward the perception of rights without duties, is profoundly alien" to the working class and its vanguard, the Soviet communists.¹¹

At the present level of development of socialist society, of course, when social relations of the communist type have not yet come into being, the development of social self-government may encounter contradictions, the surmounting of which constitutes part of the social policies of the Soviet state and the CPSU. It is necessary to perfect the forms and procedures of worker participation in administration, reciprocal coordination of the organization of the worker's labor and the functioning of the institutions of administration. In addition, not all workers are adequately ready as yet to realize the developed form of social self-government. V. I. Lenin emphasized that in addition to the law governing participation of the workers in administration "...there is still the cultural level, which cannot be subject to any law."¹²

This means that the development of collectivism is also linked to the process of harmonic development of the individual. Social and cultural policies in the Soviet Union are designed to provide the conditions for this development. One such condition is a high and comprehensive level of information on the basis of increasing the level of education. Conscious, dedicated, resourceful participation in administration constitutes a developed form of conscious creativity in the sphere of social relations, creative, active (and not merely passive) participation in culture. In this way, participation in the variety of social activities constitutes the main criterion for the all-round development of the individual as a typical feature of the social system of developed socialism.

Of course, not all problems in socialist society have been resolved, nor have all the possibilities for accelerating social progress possessed by the new society, which has achieved high levels of maturity, been realized. This was stated openly at the 26th Party Congress and subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums as well as a number of speeches by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Yu. V. Andropov. Profound analysis and solid surmounting of these difficulties and shortcomings constitute the vital groundwork for Soviet society's transition to the higher level of social progress.

Socialism, which has become a world system in our era, exerts an enormous and ever-increasing influence on international economic and political relations, on mankind's social and spiritual life. In the 20th century the struggle between the two systems has become the axis of world history, and demands of communists further development of Marxist theory. In the very first years of the existence of the Soviet state, V. I. Lenin set forth the principle of peaceful coexistence. In this way, the newborn socialism proposed ruling out war as a means of international policy.

The strengthening of the international positions of socialism has made the competition between the two systems one of the central issues of world social development. This competition is called upon to resolve the issue of the paths of mankind's development.

But it would be wrong to equate competition between the two systems with the permanent military-political rivalry which various "neo"-conservative politicians in the United States love to talk about. Of course, military parity between the USSR and the United States, which has existed for some years now, is an important factor in international relations, because it seriously impedes the imperialists' military intervention in the process of social transformations taking place in various regions of the world. But the main arena of competition between the two systems is the struggle for the minds of men.

Communists strive to confirm the superiority of the highest social-economic formation primarily in the social sphere, in the sphere of relations among people, affecting production, culture, and so on.

For Marxist-Leninists it is axiomatic that primary, decisive importance in the creation of a new society, in the struggle against imperialism, attaches to social-economic, scientific, and cultural development in the countries of genuine socialism. This fundamental position was worked out by V. I. Lenin and has become the program of action of the workers of the USSR and the other socialist countries.

Some authors in the West equate the social-economic competition between the different social systems with rivalry in the achievement of the highest quantitative indicators in all parameters, in sectors of the economy. This is incorrect. It is wrong to assume that the model of social production and corresponding consumption as developed under capitalism (for example, in the United States and Western Europe) is the "optimal" or all but "only possible" model. Furthermore, it is wrong to claim that the level of economic development is determined solely by qualitative indicators within this model.

It is difficult to deny, of course, that rising production, measured by quantitative parameters as well, provides the foundation for the necessary prerequisites of economic and social progress. But this is true only to certain limits. Beyond that comes extravagance which has nothing in common with normal human needs. This extravagance is generated by the creation of artificial needs, by capital's need to market growing masses of goods it produces. Such extravagance is economically possible only when it falls to the lot of the privileged minority or is achieved at the expense of artificially lowering the standard of living of other peoples as a result of rapacious utilization of their nonrenewable natural resources and unequal exchange.

It is obvious that the "globalization" of this model of consumption would be fraught with ecological catastrophe. For the socialist countries it is simply unacceptable, because it is in conflict with the goal-oriented principles and postulates of the socialist organization of society.

For this reason, in speaking of the economic domain of human endeavor as the main sphere of competition and struggle between the two opposing social systems it is necessary to focus not simply on comparison of volumes of production and consumption of particular types of goods (although in certain sectors and to a certain extent such comparison is inevitable and essential) but rather comparison of integral models of production and consumption evaluated in terms of how they accord with the individual and social needs of human beings.

Such a model, inter alia, assumes:

--the production and consumption primarily of goods and products designed to ensure the health and harmonic development of the human individual;

--just distribution of the goods produced in order that differences in the structure of consumption due to natural differences between people and their unequal contribution to social production, their intellectual level, do not exceed the limits beyond which social inequality arises;

--organization of economic relations such that any able-bodied person has the opportunity to engage in the production process and that this involvement affords him the opportunity to make optimal use of his capabilities and the necessary level of consumption;

--expansion of the sphere of social consumption to guarantee equality of opportunity to all society's citizens and thereby provide persons needing social support with living conditions worthy of human beings;

--increased attention on environmental protection as a vital condition of human survival.

With regard to a number of these parameters, genuine socialism has already surpassed the capitalist countries; in the case of others, the socialist countries have yet to realize plans designed to overtake the most industrially developed states.

Certain Western sociologists, proclaiming the theory of "the post-industrial society" (for example, D. Bell and others) advocate rejecting the "Marxist conceptual scheme, the axis of which is property relations." It is claimed that now it is another "axial principle" that is coming to "dominate," one which recognizes the primacy of theoretical knowledge, "intellectual technology," bringing to the forefront of social-political life some kind of "new class" of specialists instead of the working class (as some of them put it), or "a new petty bourgeoisie" (as others put it). But how can one argue that today the criterion of ownership "is losing its role" and becoming "nothing but a juridical fiction"¹³ and ignore the fundamental, essential differences between bourgeois and socialist democracy, when under capitalism the workers are not guaranteed the most essential economic and social-political rights (such as the right to work and security in the coming days, the right to free medical care, and so on), when racial and other types of discrimination have not been liquidated, and the exploitation of hired labor continues? Meanwhile, under socialism--that is, on the basis of eliminating the private-ownership system of exploitation of man by man--genuine conditions have been laid down for the creative, free development of the individual, for the flourishing of the multifaceted capabilities of people.

Socialist society, concentrating its resources and vast efforts on the realization of large-scale constructive plans mapped out over the long-term future, is not interested either in wars or in inflaming militaristic psychosis, or in a burdensome arms race. The Soviet Union and other countries of socialism have consistently stood up for detente and peaceful coexistence with capitalism.

At the present time the competition between the two systems has entered a very important phase. On the one hand, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, striving to resolve problems relating to conversion of the national economy to the intensive path of development on a modern technical and technological basis, possess the genuine capabilities for a substantial new leap forward. On the other hand, the capitalist world has entered a new and obviously rather lengthy crisis phase. What are the basic characteristic features of this, by the way?

First, more precise boundaries between domestic and international effective demand have emerged. Correspondingly, a noticeable decline in markets has developed along with more serious economic difficulties that are not only cyclical but also structural and long-term in nature. One result of this is the worsening of the competitive struggle, especially in international markets; the acuteness of this competition is exacerbated because of the clashing interests of the United States, the Western European countries, and Japan. Second, the mechanisms of state-monopolistic regulation based on earlier Keynesian recipes have not worked and have proven to be bankrupt. The orientation toward inflationary stimulation of demand (and production) on which they are based has increased inflation which, going beyond certain limits, has ceased to stimulate the economy. Artificially inflated international indebtedness has reached such a scale that the whole system of international accounts has been placed in jeopardy. Third, capitalism has not been up to the task of preventing the social consequences of the restructuring of production on a new technical and technological basis; as a result, a substantial percentage of the workers, for whom capitalist society has no use, have been ejected from the production process on a mass scale.

It would be wrong, of course, to underestimate and belittle the reserves which imperialism still possesses. It is obvious, however, that in the 1980s it finds itself in conditions which are very difficult, perhaps the most difficult conditions in the whole postwar period. Now many defenders of the capitalist system, including some of the "new liberals," have begun to speak of the necessity of seeking "acceptable alternatives."

Marx proved that historically there can be only one real alternative to capitalism--the transition to socialism.

Socialism has now established itself in a number of countries. On various continents. And one of the basic conclusions that Marxist-Leninists draw from analyzing processes that are going on in the modern world is this: socialism has become a developed social-economic formation in opposition to capitalism. Its advent and development have opened up to mankind the road to the future.

FOOTNOTES

1. Yu. V. Andropov, "Karl Marx's Teachings and Certain Questions of Socialist Construction in the USSR," *KOMMUNIST*, No 3, 1983, p 21.
2. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," Vol 16, p 10.
3. The attempts by various "critics" of Marxism-Leninism to dispute the correctness of conclusions concerning the importance of uniting scientific socialism with the workers movement or to incorrectly deny the positive significance of this union have been and remain incorrect.
4. V. I. Lenin, "Complete Collected Works," Vol 34, p 116.

5. Yu. V. Andropov, op. cit., p 20.
6. See "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1980 g." [National Economy of the USSR in 1980], pp 40, 369; VESTNIK STATISTIKI No 5, 1981, p 74.
7. "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1980 g.," pp 369-370.
8. K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., Vol 4, p 371.
9. Yu. V. Andropov, "Shest'desyat let SSSR" [Sixty Years of the USSR], Moscow, 1982, p 7.
10. K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., Vol 3, p 76.
11. Yu. V. Andropov, "Bibliography," KOMMUNIST, No 3, 1983, p 19.
12. V. I. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 38, p 170.
13. Daniel Bell, "The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. A Venture in Social Forecasting," New York, 1973, pp 10-11.

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ANALYSIS OF MITTERRAND'S LEFTIST ADMINISTRATION

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[Article by I. M. Bunin: "France: Difficult Changes. (Results of the First Year's Performance of the Leftist Government)"]

[Text] After the presidential and parliamentary elections of 1981, control over executive and legislative administration in France was transferred into the hands of the left. F. Mitterrand, leader of the French Socialist Party (PSF), was elected president of France for a 7-year term. In the parliamentary elections the PSF obtained an absolute majority of seats in the National Assembly. The influence of the left in the country rose substantially as a result of conclusion of a governmental agreement between the Communist Party and the Socialist Party and the inclusion of four communists in the government. In 1981 the left occupied powerful positions in local organs of administration: they headed municipalities in about two-thirds of the cities having a population of over 9,000 and controlled almost half of the general councils, organs of local government on the department level. Thanks to the Communist Party's close ties with the General Confederation of Labor, the leftist government was able to count on the considerable sympathies of the French labor movement.

After the victory at the polls, the leftist government, which has the authority of appointing about 400 key state posts, carried out personnel shifts in a number of vital executive institutions. Substantial changes were implemented in the Corps of Prefects, affecting about 120 persons. Some 16 of 27 French university rectors were replaced, and 50 to 60 media officials were dismissed. Major shifts were carried out among directors of ministry administration, and more than half of them were replaced.¹ In assessing the reorganization carried out by the leftist government at the top of the state apparatus, most objective commentators and scientists consider unjust the campaign launched by the right-wing press to accuse the left of a "witch hunt," a "pink terror," a "political purge." According to journalist N.-J. Berger, in early 1982 the replacements which were unequivocally political in nature affected less than 20 percent of the total number of posts of leadership.²

The political situation that developed in the country enabled the PCF [French Communist Party] to comment that the left's coming to power by no means entailed an inevitable "repeat of the classic social-democratic experience of crisis management."³

The main platform for social transformations in France is the PSF program, in which the key factor is the concept of a "break" with capitalism. In the resolution of the PSF congress held in October 1981 in Valence, the French socialists affirmed the necessity of a "break" with capitalism, to be carried out on the basis of "gradual" and "step-by-step" social transformations and under conditions of "compromise" with the bourgeoisie.⁴ The PSF leaders declared their refusal to copy the social-democratic experience and affirmed that they would build a "unique social model" (P. Mauroy). In Mitterrand's opinion, Swedish social democracy was wrong in that it left "control over the economy" in the hands of a few monopolies. He emphasized the significance of experiments of introducing "self-administration" in the enterprises of the FRG and the implementation of nationalization by the British Labor Party. "We," F. Mitterrand affirmed, "possess an aggregate of all these experiments and can proceed further."⁵

In the first year of its activities, the leftist government carried out reforms in a variety of spheres: the economy, the state administration system, the court system, the tax structure, the education system, labor relations, and so on. In December 1981 R. Andrier, editor in chief of L'HUMANITE, commented that although the policy being implemented by the government "is not exactly the one which we would carry out if the results of the general voting afforded us that possibility, neither is it a policy of the social-democratic type." He wrote further that "in some spheres it goes further than one might have expected at first."⁶

Compared with the typical practices of the social democrats, who under conditions of economic crisis functioned primarily as the "business managers" of capitalism,⁷ a unique feature of the activities of the French leftist government has been the strategy of structural reforms. Coming to power at a time of extremely unfavorable economic conditions, the left immediately--in the first year of its administration--carried out structural transformations of French society: they expanded the nationalized sector, decentralized the system of state administration, and gave new rights to workers in the enterprises. The French socialists affirmed that by means of structural reforms they were striving to create a base for implementing a long-term course of social transformations (in P. Mauroy's words, to build a "foundation of changes"). In their opinion, these transformations do not constitute classic reformism, because implementing them means crossing a definite threshold. "Each taken separately," wrote J. Martinet, one of the ideologues of the PSF, "these measures are unable to change present society. Some of them can be realized adequately within the framework of a bourgeois state (for example, regional autonomy in Switzerland, the FRG, or the United States). But applied simultaneously, they will fundamentally alter the correlation of social forces and afford the possibility--but only the possibility--of change."⁸

Rejecting the plans of the "moderate" wing of the PSF, which proposed primarily to regulate current problems and, having restored macroeconomic equilibrium, to secure the trust of the bosses [patronat] and international capital, the leftist government immediately undertook to carry out structural reforms, striving to utilize the favorable political situation: the disarray and

unpreparedness of the right, and the unspent capital of trust in public opinion. Explaining the causes of the rapid pace of nationalization, in an interview broadcast on British television on 8 September 1981 Mitterrand stated: "We began this effort immediately after the Parliament was elected. There are urgent reasons for this. For if we don't do it now, we never will. To say nothing of the inflexibility, the pressure, the events which crowd in and literally take you by the throat, political life simply sweeps you aside. But what will be done will be done."

In the strategy of structural reforms of the leftist government, nationalization occupies a central place. Without accepting the more radical plans of the PCF, F. Mitterrand nevertheless rejected the proposals of the "moderate" elements of the PSF who wanted to restrict nationalization to the acquisition of the controlling stock in the companies to be nationalized.

The leftist government nationalized 36 private banks with total deposits exceeding 1 billion francs. Also coming under state control were the Pariba and Suez finance companies. As a result of these measures, the state controls 90 percent of deposits and 85 percent of credits.⁹ Striking a blow against the interests of the financial oligarchy, the leftist government created in the credit sphere a fundamentally new structure having no counterparts in the developed capitalist countries. The government's idea is that the new banking system will promote reorientation of capital investments out of real estate and into spheres where they rapidly bring maximum benefits--the productive sectors of industry vitally necessary to the nation. "The financiers," wrote J. LeGarrec, then state secretary (under the prime minister) in charge of expanding the state sector, "channel all their activities into short-term interests relating to profit. We, on the other hand, will proceed on the basis of long-term economic interests, the interests of industrial development."¹⁰

Nationalization also achieved impressive magnitude in the sphere of industrial production. The gross turnover of nine companies coming under the nationalization law is estimated at 250 billion francs. They account for about 20 percent of all sales of French industry and 15 percent of French exports. In all, the expanded nationalized sector accounts for 32 percent of French industrial output and 24 percent of the personnel of the industrial enterprises.¹¹

Originally it was proposed to pay stockholders about 35 billion francs over the span of 15 years. After the Constitutional Council refused to accept the Parliament's proposed compensation principle as just, the total was to rise to 41-43 billion francs.

A report prepared by a special commission headed by State Minister M. Rocard maps out the following principles of the French system of planning. First, planning must be democratic and built on a contractual basis. This means that in the course of negotiations the state, local organs of administration, and the companies will determine their mutual obligations. Second, planning must be decentralized, with regional development plans occupying an important place. Third, planning will be permanent in nature, while its goals and the means to accomplish them will be constantly reviewed.

Substantial nationalization, expansion of the prerogatives of the planning organs, and democratization of the system of administration of state companies create certain prerequisites for the shaping of a democratic alternative to the existing economic structures.¹² As the eminent American economist V. Leontieff correctly commented, it opens up the possibility of "achieving control over economic decisions" and mapping out investment policies which determine the adaptability of the French economy to the scientific-technical revolution.¹³ Thanks to nationalization, the state can expand capital investment in industry and thereby liquidate the sluggishness of the investment process that has existed since the mid-1970s through the fault of private capital.

The new wave of nationalization in France does not constitute "socialization of the losses" of the private sector. The nationalized sector incorporated primarily enterprises of new, dynamic sectors promoting technical progress. As F. Mitterrand stated, the nationalized sector will become "the economic strike force of French industry," a "pole of development" for small and medium-sized enterprises. The bosses will find it much more difficult than in the postwar period to "assimilate" the nationalized sector and gradually dilute it in the system of private monopolistic relations. But it would be wrong to rule out the involution of the state sector in France. An example of that is the rebirth of Italian state enterprise.¹⁴ Thus, the fate of the newly created economic structures will be decided in the course of further class battles.

One major structural reform of the leftist government, represented by P. Mauroy as a "great task of the five-year period," is the implementation of decentralization. The purpose of this reform is to resolve a problem of long standing--that of bringing down the (traditional for France) high level of centralization of state authority by expanding the powers of the local organs on the commune, department and regional level. The first major attempt to regionalize France was undertaken by C. de Gaulle, but his plan failed in the referendum of 1969. In 1972, G. Pompidou introduced a purely formalistic division of the country into 21 regions--economic units incorporating several departments. At first, V. Giscard d'Estaing intended to endow the region with administrative authority, organizing local parliaments on this level, but later he dropped the project. The well-known French sociologist M. Crozier commented that there was not a single political figure in the 1970s who did not declare himself to be a strong advocate of "decentralization." But the efforts of these politicians only strengthened the control exercised by the centralized apparatus.¹⁵

The leftist government energetically undertook to resolve the problem of decentralization of the state administration. The institution of appointment of prefects, set up by Napoleon I, was eliminated. The prefects, who represent the symbol of the French state, have been replaced by republic governmental commissars who have lost the right of tutelage over the decisions of local authorities. From now on the decisions and decrees of the organs of local government are subject to immediate execution. If, however, the republic commissar considers them to be unlawful, he must submit the matter to an administrative court for adjudication within 3 months. Organs of government

on the commune, department or regional level (municipalities, general and regional councils) have been given the right to draw up their own budget and carry on economic activities. The powers of the presidents of general councils have been expanded. The republic commissars have lost the right to monitor their activities as the prefects did formerly. An important factor in the course of decentralization is the statute governing the holding of direct general elections of members of the regional council, which has become the plenipotentiary organ of local government. In preparation is a tax reform which is to increase the budgets of the local authorities at the expense of the state budget. All local organs, in conducting their business, must take account of the orientation of the national plan. Corsica has been given special status, which includes the right to elect its own parliament.

The reform is bringing France up to the level of the other developed capitalist countries in terms of the degree of decentralization of social structures. But even after it is accomplished, the independence of the local organs of authority in France will be less than, for example, in Great Britain, the FRG, and Italy. The only form of control of the central authorities in Great Britain over the activities of the local authorities are the subsidies granted to them. In the FRG, every Land has its own parliament and government and, despite all attempts by the central administration to undermine the powers of the local authorities, they are broader there than in France. The local organs in West Germany possess greater financial capabilities than in France, as well as full responsibility in matters of local administration. After the reform carried out in 1970, all of Italy was divided into regions possessing elective parliaments (with the right to promulgate laws) and executive organs.

Like the expansion of the state sector, decentralization of social life potentially has two options of development. The transformations that have been carried out, having weakened France's traditional centralism and bureaucratism, might boil down just to a refinement of the state-monopolistic mechanism, providing it with a certain flexibility that is so essential to the economic and political structures of modern bourgeois society. Without decentralization, French state-monopolistic capitalism would be threatened by hardening of the arteries of the basic structures, the loss of flexibility, and political and economic ineffectiveness. Decentralization makes it possible to resolve more quickly and effectively the problems of the small and medium-sized enterprises, which are experiencing economic difficulties. The relevant juridical norms as well as new instruments of economic influence (for example, the regional investment banks) have been set up for this kind of activity on the part of local organs of administration. Local organs of government are capable at least of somewhat alleviating the social tension arising out of macroeconomic decisions taken by the state or due to the economic activities of multinational corporations.

It is quite possible that decentralization could become a vital stage in the democratization of French society, a component part of a democratic alternative to the existing economic system. But an important prerequisite for this is the establishment of close collaboration between the local organs of administration and the professional organizations operating within the commune,

department, or region, and corresponding democratization of the makeup and principles of operation of those institutions within which this collaboration is carried on (development committees, committees for regional economic development, and so on). At the same time, the activities of the local organs must be included in the context of national planning rather than being guided by "parochial" interests.

Expansion of the powers of the local organs, of course, creates the potential possibility of mobilizing "local energy," of galvanizing the activities of the institutions of "civilian society," especially voluntary associations of various types. But realization of this potential depends crucially on the methods of instituting the reform and on the vigor of the voluntary associations.

The leftist government is also carrying out reforms in the sphere of expanding the rights of the working people in enterprises. In the autumn of 1981, Labor Minister J. Auroux delivered a report, and in the spring and autumn of 1982 five laws concerning labor relations were passed.¹⁶

On a number of points, J. Auroux's report deviated considerably from F. Mitterrand's pre-election program. Thus, enterprise committees were not given the right of veto in matters of dismissal, as incorporated in the Socialist Party's program. The government did not accept the parliamentary commission's amendment allowing workers to halt production processes in the event of violations of labor safety and the development of health hazards. This postulate was included in F. Mitterrand's pre-election manifesto and is in force in the labor codes of Sweden and Denmark.

The report advances the idea of the inviolability of the principle of "unity of administration"--that is, retention of the prerogatives of the entrepreneur, and rejects the idea of "co-administration" on the West German model. In the sphere of administration, the new laws are even less radical than the proposals of the well-known technocrat F. Bloch-Laine, who in his 1963 book "For the Reform of Enterprise" proposed subjecting enterprise management to the control of an "oversight commission" made up of representatives of capital, personnel, and the state.¹⁷ The report of the Sudreaux Commission, prepared in 1975, went even further. This report recommended creating a new institution in the enterprise--"co-participation in control"--which would give the personnel one-third of the places on oversight councils of companies employing more than 1,000 persons. At the same time, all these ideas remained at the stage of theoretical formulations.

Despite all the deviations from F. Mitterrand's pre-election manifesto, the new laws did represent a vital step on the path of democratization of labor relations in France. The reform affected a variety of aspects of labor relations, and about one-third of the articles of the French labor code were revised.

The labor code includes provision for obligatory annual negotiations between enterprise management and personnel with regard to questions affecting wages and seniority. By means of this measure the leftist government intends to

liquidate the traditional backwardness of the French system of collective bargaining. This provision, which is progressive for contemporary French labor legislation, was established in the United States, for example, as far back as the 1930s in the Wagner Act, which was passed during F. Roosevelt's New Deal.

After fierce class battles in the late 1960s, the Italian labor statutes were revised to include a provision that "the working people in an enterprise must be citizens in the full sense of the word." The Italian working people were given the opportunity to express their political convictions in the workplace and hold meetings during worktime. In France, however, formal political meetings in enterprises are still prohibited, although the document of the country's labor minister states that the working people should be citizens not only in society but also in the enterprise.

One of the most original ideas in the government's bills is recognition of the workers' right to "direct expression" of opinion (for example, through the "shop councils"). The Parliament passed a law preparing the necessary conditions for creating institutions through which the workers' new rights could be realized. For the first time in France the working people will be given the opportunity to express their opinion with regard to matters of pay, organization, and conditions of labor. The structures to be set up can serve as a full-fledged tool of psychological stimulation of labor effort in line with the concept, which arose in the United States, of "labor enrichment," which enables the workers themselves to establish labor norms and rhythms, to include control among the workers' functions, and to create semi-autonomous brigades responsible for a particular complex of operations. But it is quite possible to convert "shop councils" or other structures of "direct expression" into "plant councils" of the Italian type directly expressing the interests of the working people and playing such a prominent role in the Italian workers' movement. At the same time, this variant of development is possible only in cases of favorable attitudes on the part of the whole trade union movement to the idea of "shop councils." "Reformist trade unions" have a definitely negative attitude toward them: the Force Ouvriere views "shop councils" as a stage on the path of "Sovietization" of the economy, while the General Conference of Cadres views them as subverting the traditional hierarchical structures. The bosses, in turn, completely reject the Auroux report, claiming that its adoption would lead to "paralysis of the enterprise." And it is rather difficult to overcome the resistance of the bosses, who possess enormous experience in fighting the organs of workers' representation.

While noting that the Auroux report represents an "important step forward," the PCF emphasizes at the same time that the measures being prepared do not correspond to the proclaimed goal of "converting the workers into vehicles of transformations in the enterprises." L'HUMANITE writes that the disciplinary power of the bosses is practically intact, while the political rights of the workers are not fully recognized.¹⁸

On the whole, characterization of the Auroux laws in class terms cannot be unequivocal. On the one hand, the laws adopted by the leftist majority will unquestionably strengthen the positions of the workers' organizations in the

enterprises. On the other hand, in a qualitatively different political situation the new laws are laying down the conditions for policies of "social partnership" and for the class-based French trade unions' transition to positions of "businesslike trade-unionism."

In the sphere of redistribution of the national income, the leftist government has introduced a tax on large fortunes. Such a tax exists in 10 of the 21 countries of the OECD. With the exception of Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries, the rate of the tax on large fortunes does not exceed 1 percent. In October 1976, R. Barre's French government attempted to introduce such a tax but, encountering the fierce resistance of the property owners and stock exchange circles, it was obliged to withdraw the bill from the National Assembly's agenda.

Mitterrand's pre-election program called for introducing very high tax rates (up to 8 percent). In the process of discussing the bill, the government made substantial concessions, agreeing to impose an annual tax of 0.5 percent on fortunes of 3-5 million francs, 1 percent on fortunes ranging from 5-10 million francs, and 1.5 percent on fortunes over 10 million francs. The tax affected only 200,000 taxpayers and brought into the treasury an insignificant portion of tax revenues. In order not to undermine the investment capabilities of the private sector, the government introduced a special discount for persons whose holdings include the tools of labor--their fortunes are taxed starting at the 5-million-franc level. Moreover, in autumn of 1982 the government introduced a substantial reduction in the tax rate on large fortunes, exempting until 1985 those entrepreneurs investing capital in production.

As for democratization of social life, from the start the measures of the parliament and the leftist government manifested a definite tendency toward doing away with the most authoritarian features of the Fifth Republic: the Court of State Security was liquidated, the death penalty was abolished, one-fifth of all prisoners were amnestied, immigrant workers' conditions were improved and their civil rights expanded. Antistrike laws passed in the 1970s were repealed. Similar reforms have been carried out in other developed capitalist countries during administrations of liberal and social-democratic governments. Reforms designed to democratize social life were also carried out during the first years of V. Giscard d'Estaing's presidency (giving 18-year-olds the right to vote, liberalization of divorce procedures, legalization of abortion, and so on), but later on, under the pressure of conservative circles, more authoritarian tendencies took the upper hand.

Some reforms carried out under the leftist government are bringing France into the ranks of those countries possessing the broadest of bourgeois-democratic rights;¹⁹⁻²⁰ others merely liquidate those "archaic" elements which were retained in French law until 1981. For example, France was the last of the Western European countries to abolish the death penalty. It was not until 2 October 1981--30 years after the European Agreement on Human Rights was signed--that France ratified Article 25 of the agreement, which gives French citizens the right to appeal to the European Court on Human Rights.

The leftist coalition began its transformational activities by resolving a number of problems formulated by the previous administration but for various reasons never resolved by it. A number of the leftist government's bills go back to the ideas of the "leftist technocratic" clubs of the mid-1960s (for example, the J. Moulin Club), the proposals of the left-wing Gaullists, the formulations of the liberal sociologists (in particular, M. Crozier), or the "new society" program formulated by French Prime Minister J. Chaban-Delmas in 1969.

France's retrograde ruling class, however, proved incapable of realizing these reforms. The whole program of J. Chaban-Delmas "new society" was quickly blocked by the conservative elements of the right-of-center coalition and the bosses. By 1972, the conservative P. Mesmer replaced the bourgeois reformist J. Chaban-Delmas as prime minister. During the initial period of V. Giscard d'Estaing's administration, attempts were also undertaken to institute reforms in taxes (a tax on speculative profits, a land tax, a tax on large fortunes) and to introduce co-administration in the enterprises (the Sudreux Commission report). But these reforms were either blocked by the bosses or their content gutted in the course of parliamentary debates.

The dynamics of transformations under the leftist government are of a different character. The reforms were implemented immediately and affected many spheres of social life. The left's resolve to make structural reforms irreversible can hardly be doubted.

Above all, these reforms can serve to overcome France's lag behind the other Western European states in the social sphere; "bottlenecks" in French society (excessive centralization, shortage of capital investments in industry, inadequately developed contractual relations between the bosses and the trade unions, extremes of social inequality, and so on) have been liquidated. Unquestionably, as a result of transformations carried out under the leftist government, many obstacles in the path of free development of French capitalism will be liquidated.

In this regard, the left has always played a progressive role in French society. Since 1789 France has developed in fits and starts: in those brief periods when leftist political forces have been in power, important reforms have been carried out, with the result that the country moved well ahead of its neighbors, after which it again began to lag behind during long periods of stagnation. Reforms have generally been carried out under conditions of acute social-political crises, under the powerful pressure of the working class. Long periods between reforms have been characterized by the "inaction" of rightist or right-of-center governments striving to "digest" this mass of reforms and secure a new level of equilibrium.

The aggregate of reforms recently carried out, of course, does not entail a break with capitalism. They merely create more favorable prerequisites for new social transformations and only in the course of further class battles will it become clear whether the process of social transformations will be continued or whether the French bourgeoisie will again succeed, as it did after the National Front and the progressive changes that were accomplished

during the first postwar years, in filling the structures created by the left with bourgeois content.

By means of structural reforms, the leftist government has created the necessary set of instruments which should, by the logic of the pre-election program, ensure subsequent long-range transformations of the economy and social relations. Having taken into its hands the vast state sector in industry and the banking sphere, transformed the system of planning and administrative management, and changed labor relations in the enterprise through special measures, the leftist government hoped to boost the rate of economic growth. On this basis it proposed to resolve the employment problem, to strengthen French products' ability to compete in foreign and especially domestic markets, to liquidate or at least substantially reduce inflation, and in this way to proceed to a more just structure of distribution and redistribution of income.

Implementing in practice the long-term program of the leftist government urgently requires meeting two conditions: unconditional support of the working people and at least neutrality on the part of the capitalist environment. The leftist government, meanwhile, has not succeeded in guaranteeing either condition.

Complicated relations have developed between the workers and their organizations, on the one hand, and the leftist government, on the other. The left's coming to power caused the working people's expectations to rise sharply. After the parliamentary elections of 1981, according to a survey conducted by the SOFRES Institute of Public Opinion, 59 percent of Frenchmen were satisfied with the results while 44 percent believed that the victory of the left would exert a positive influence on their daily life (only 17 percent responded "negative").²¹ Most workers hoped that implementation of F. Mitterrand's programs would also lead to a rise in their standard of living as well as enhanced "quality of life"--a lower retirement age, a shorter work week, and longer vacations.

Making good on preelection promises, P. Mauroy's government in June and November 1981 raised the minimum wage, minimum old-age pensions, and family and housing aid. As a result of these measures, retired persons, especially those with low pensions, and recipients of family aid were the biggest winners. After 10 May 1982, the minimum wage was increased by 25 percent annually in current prices, while the purchasing power of its recipients increased by 10 percent. Thanks to the substantial increase in the minimum wage, the number of minimum wage recipients tripled.²²⁻²³ At the same time the government, afraid to disrupt the equilibrium between effective demand and real supply, conducted an extremely cautious policy in the sphere of wages and strove merely to maintain the purchasing power of the lagging categories of workers.

A key element in the social policies of the leftist government during the first year of its administration was the struggle against unemployment. Proclaiming the employment strategy to be "an absolute priority," the new

administration mobilized vast resources for the purpose. The 1982 budget called for launching a complex of measures designed to slow further unemployment growth in 1982 and reduce it to zero in 1983. To provide greater employment, about 100 billion francs were allocated from the state budget (16 percent of all civilian budget funds).

P. Mauroy's government planned to create between 400,000 and 500,000 additional jobs in 1982-1983. It also expanded the previous administration's practice of exempting entrepreneurs who hired former schoolchildren from payments into the social security fund; it adopted a program to perfect the system of vocational-technical training and include an additional 160,000 persons aged 16 to 18; it gave discharged servicemen the right to sign a temporary work contract for a period of one-half year. The government restricted opportunities for taking temporary work, different forms of which were widespread in France during years of economic crisis, and in a number of cases banned moonlighting. In the second half of 1982 it adopted a number of measures to provide jobs to persons who had been unemployed a long time.

In addition to these measures, the government attempted to change the situation in the labor market by reducing work times. It enacted a number of ordinances in this regard in 1982. The leftist government satisfied the trade unions' traditional demand to reduce the retirement age. As of 1 April 1983, retirement age was reduced from 65 to 60. The government's ordinance concerning the length of the work week calls for introducing a fifth week of paid vacation and shortening the work week to 39 hours.

In its ordinance on "solidarity contracts" the state declared its readiness to take over some of the employer's payments into the social security fund (from 50 to 75 percent) in cases where the firm it runs gives its workers and employees the opportunity to retire at 55 with 80 percent of salary or shortens the work week to 36 or 37 hours. To obtain benefits under the "solidarity contracts," the firm must hire unemployed persons or persons seeking work for the first time to fill the vacant jobs. By May 1982, the government had released 31,000 work places on the basis of "solidarity contracts."

Having achieved certain positive results in the struggle against unemployment, the leftist government, however, failed to win the "employment struggle." It was only able to stabilize unemployment somewhat.

Having failed to satisfy the high expectations of the workers, who assumed that the coming to power of the left would liquidate the crisis, do away with unemployment, and change their everyday life, the government came up against a certain amount of disillusionment among them.

Starting in February and March of 1982, the French workers became more militant; they began to be more demanding and obstinate. Compared with the preceding period (from July 1980 through June 1981), during the first year of administration of the leftist government the number of labor conflicts rose by more than 1.5 times (from 2,475 to 3,947), and the number of working days lost as a result of strikes doubled (from 11 million to 23 million).²⁴ The

signs of disillusionment with the performance of the left also appeared in the political arena: cantonal elections in March of 1982 resulted in gains for the rightist opposition.

During the first year of the "leftist experiment," however, the government on the whole retained the support of the workers and their organizations. By carrying out structural reforms, the new administration was consciously striving to strengthen the trade unions' positions and alter the correlation of forces in favor of the working class. Thanks to a number of new laws (concerning expansion of the rights of the workers in the enterprises, democratization of the makeup of the administrative councils of the nationalized companies, repeal of the anti-trade union ordinance of 1967 concerning the parity system of administration of social security funds, and so on), and also thanks to a number of bills in the process of formulation (concerning democratization of the planning system and the makeup of the social and economic council), the political weight of the trade unions has been rising. The government supported the strikers in the Citroen and Talbot automotive plants, who are struggling to gain administrative recognition of the workers' legal rights with respect to unimpeded activities of their representative organs.

As a result, the workers perceive the government--if not as their ally--at least as a potential point of support in the struggle with the entrepreneurs. This can be traced, in particular, in analyzing the dynamics of strikes. Despite an overall rise in the number of local labor conflicts, the number of major national strikes, which would constitute a potential hazard for the leftist government, substantially declined compared with the preceding period. According to a number of surveys, the masses retain a sense that France is being run by a government which is concerned for the interests of the working people. In June 1982, 53 percent of those surveyed stated that the government "cares about Frenchmen's concerns."²⁵

At the same time, the workers' support for the leftist government was basically passive in nature. "We voted for you, and now you're doing as you please," runs the leitmotif of many statements by workers and employees. During the preelection campaign, F. Mitterrand declared that the country needed a "national upsurge." What was needed to galvanize creative energy, F. Mitterrand affirmed, was for "each one to have a sense of being mobilized" and feel that he is "participating in important matters." Despite the victory of the left, however, no "national upsurge" took place, and a passive and apolitical atmosphere prevailed in the country as a result of the economic depression. Having laid on the leftist government the task of resolving national problems, broad segments of the working people still preferred not to take the path of active social-political struggle.

As the chief governmental party, the PSF is ill-adapted to secure for the leftist government the active support of the working people and their organizations. Its membership does not exceed 250,000 (in 1982, the PCF had 710,000 members). Nor does the PSF possess a broad social base among the working class: in 1979 workers constituted only 10 percent of all members of the Socialist Party (versus 51 percent in the Communist Party), while rank-and-file employees constituted only 12 percent.²⁶ After 1971, the socialists

decided to set up their own cells in the enterprises, but this policy did not achieve outstanding results: 10 years later the PSF had only 1,300 cells and groups in the enterprises (versus about 10,000 for the PCF). Moreover, only 21 percent of the members of the Socialist Party's production cells were workers (22 percent employees, 42 percent engineering-technical and administrative personnel).²⁷ It failed to establish close ties with the trade unions, and the socialists' relations with the workers' trade union centers, according to the well-known political scientist M. Duverger, are the "Achilles' heel" of the Socialist Party.²⁸ It is clear that unless the working people's and their organizations' passive support is transformed into active support, there is danger that the government will be cut off from the masses and that the leftist regime will become technocratized and bureaucratized.

A real obstacle on the path of these transformations is the French bourgeoisie along with the international capital which supports it. On coming to power, the left assumed that during the whole transition period, until the new structures of administration and regulation began to function effectively (the state production sector, planning, changes in the proportion of distribution of income, and so on), the old principles and mechanisms (profits and competition) would have to ensure normal production and the satisfaction of social needs. The government hoped that by means of powerful levers of economic regulation and substantial concessions to private capital it could impose its strategy of economic growth on the bosses. But it clearly overestimated the capabilities of state regulation in an economic system based on principles of private capitalism. By the end of 1981, F. Mitterrand acknowledged the difficulty of implementing leftist policies "under conditions of a social-economic system where the key positions are occupied by the right."

Even since the nationalization carried out by the leftist government, the dominating positions in the "mixed economy" are occupied by the private sector. It possesses potentially significant investment capabilities and is able to substantially expand employment in its enterprises. Under conditions of the strategy of gradual social transformations, the bosses' assumption of positions of active resistance to the "leftist experiment" and their utilization of economic levers of pressure--economic sabotage, curtailment of production, mass flight of capital--would place the fate of the leftist government in jeopardy. "A strike by investors or employers," wrote economic commentator J. Boissant in 1977, "is more dangerous for a leftist government than a strike by electrical, railroad or postal workers for a right-of-center coalition."²⁹

The leftist government's strategy of "compromise" with the bourgeoisie was designed to achieve agreement with the "world of money." To secure it, on 16 April 1982 P. Mauroy announced a number of measures designed to alleviate the tax burden on the French enterprises: the government reduced by 11 billion francs the amount of turnover taxes the entrepreneurs were supposed to pay in 1982-1983 (10 percent of the total tax). The government also agreed not to increase the private sector's payments into the social insurance fund until 1983 and to gradually take over pension payments. It was decided to increase once more subsidies to investors and exporters. Finally, the

government promised not to shorten the work week further by legislation. According to LE MONDE's calculations, the bosses gained 5 billion francs in 1982 and 16 billion francs in 1983 from these measures.³⁰ In return for these concessions, the government called upon the entrepreneurs to "get engaged in the struggle to ensure employment" by increasing capital investments, creating new jobs, and improving the vocational training system.

However, the measures designed to encourage private investment did not yield the desired results. The entrepreneurs did not expand capital investments in industry, nor did they increase productive capacity or the number of employees in their enterprises. In 1981 less than half of the enterprises' profits were reinvested in industry. According to preliminary data, the private sector invested about 100 billion francs in industry in 1982--that is, much less than in the pre-crisis period of 1973. The nationalized sector, utilizing only 24 percent of the personnel of the industrial enterprises, invested more than the whole private sector in industry.

All the leftist government's appeals to the entrepreneurs' patriotism, duty, and conscience have remained the "voice of one crying in the wilderness." The PCF has emphasized that the benefits given to the private sector do not guarantee an increase in capital investments. "The bitter experience of the past," wrote L'HUMANITE, "indicates that today's revenues are not converted into tomorrow's capital investments or day after tomorrow's new jobs."³¹ The leftist socialists have also remarked that the government is waging "defensive battles" with the entrepreneurs. "It is completely useless," says J. Sarre, one of the leaders of the left wing of the PSF, "to expect big capital to revive economic activities. The initiative can come only from an expanded state sector."

The Communist Party proposes to manifest greater firmness in the strategy of "compromise" with the bosses and considers it dangerous to count on the "good will" of the entrepreneurs. The Communist Party advocates not counting solely on the vague promises of the bosses but rather exacting from them precise and concrete obligations in return for any compromises on the part of the government.

The leftist government also failed to take sufficient account of the extent to which France depends on international capital. The inherited system of trade and financial ties with other countries makes the French economy greatly dependent on the state of economic activity in the industrially developed region of the capitalist world and the world market. The critical situation in the world capitalist economy has complicated France's ability to set out on the path of economic upsurge. Immediately after the left came to power, the newspaper LES ECHOS, the mouthpiece of the French bosses, declared that the collapse of the new policy was inevitable: "The reason why the experiment undertaken by the socialists has not a chance of success is essentially simple: the French crisis proper is developing in a situation of world crisis.... Under such conditions, no attempt to carry out an original social or economic policy will yield positive results."³²

In undertaking to stimulate business activity, the French government counted on a revival of economic activities in the world capitalist economy. But the expected upsurge in the economy of the West did not materialize. Since mid-1982, the leaders of the PSF have become more restrained in their assessments of the prospects of getting out of the crisis. "Our duty," P. Mauroy stated, "is to be prepared for the crisis to continue a long time and its consequences to affect everyone."³³

After 10 May 1981, France attempted to go it alone against the currents of the depressed world market conditions. By expanding demand and through a number of incentive measures the leftist government attempted to create favorable conditions for reviving investment activities within the country. It launched vigorous activities in the international arena, trying to persuade its partners to change priorities of state economic policies and focus not on combatting inflation by means of credit restrictions and high interest rates but on controlling unemployment instead. But even at the price of strengthening the "Atlantic" tones in its foreign policies, the leftist government did not succeed in achieving the desired effect.³⁴ The leading capitalist countries did not follow France's advice. The Reagan administration maintained high loan capital interest rates in the American market, forcing the French government to maintain excessively high loan interest rates in order to avoid a drain of capital, which had an extremely negative effect on economic activities. Housing Construction Minister Roger Quilliot called the United States credit policies "insane." As he put it, they constitute "a great danger to the West."³⁵ The sharp rise in the dollar's exchange rate in 1981 and the first half of 1982 gave rise to a substantial deficit in France's balance of payments.

Washington's policies for artificially hiking the dollar's exchange rate and its speculation on bank discount rates to a large extent promoted an unprecedented rise in France's trade and payment deficit. According to French economists' calculations, the American economic policies accounted for half of France's 102.1 billion-franc total payment deficit in 1982.

The leading capitalist countries continued to implement a deflationary policy and managed to reduce the rate of inflation, while in France prices continued to rise at the previous rate. This led to a weakening of French products' ability to compete in domestic and foreign markets. Trade with the main capitalist countries (the United States, West Germany, Japan) became less and less advantageous to France.

Finally, the attacks on the franc continued unabated. To defend it, France was compelled to spend free reserves of foreign currency, with the result that they were reduced by almost three times. In one interview, former Prime Minister R. Barre stated directly that "the repeated attacks on the franc represent revenge on the part of foreign states which are dissatisfied with how France conducts its affairs."

International capital has demanded with increasing insistence that the French government change the priorities of its social-economic policies, refrain from social reforms, and introduce "economic austerity." According to the

well-known French economist R. Priouret, international financiers "defend the integrity of the Western economic system" and therefore "strive to promote the collapse of the leftist experiment."³⁶

Under pressure of international capital, in mid-June 1982 France was obliged to devalue the franc a second time and reduce its parity with the German mark by 8.8 percent. The June devaluation was accompanied by a number of special measures: establishment of control over rises in prices and a freeze on prices and wages, trade profits, and dividends until 31 October 1982. This complex of measures entailed a shift in emphasis in the government's policies onto efforts to control inflation. The main goal of the French government came to be that of enhancing the ability of the country's industry to compete on the basis of reduced outlays on production and inflation control. As F. Mitterrand stated at his 9 June 1982 press conference, the "second stage of changes now begins in France."³⁷

During this period the PSF leaders stopped resorting to "revolutionary" rhetoric. State Minister J.-P. Chevenement, who had earlier declared that the "break" with capitalism would take place in 100 days, stated in June 1982 that F. Mitterrand had been elected president of the country not in order to build socialism in France but to create "a modern state." F. Mitterrand himself no longer characterizes the present phase of social transformations as a "break" with capitalism but as the development of "mixed society" and the creation of "a contractual state." At a press conference on 9 June 1982, F. Mitterrand declared that his goal is not to create "a French model of socialism" but "a national revival."

All of this entails a review of the goals of activity of the leftist government. As J.-P. Chevenement stated, because of international isolation the building of socialism is not on France's agenda today. He ruled out the possibility of advancing along the path of creating a new society without corresponding changes in the policies of the other Western European countries and an improved international climate in the 1980s. Thus, the combined pressure of the international financial circles, France's main trading partners, and the bosses compelled the leftist government to readjust its social-economic strategy. To retain the previous character of foreign economic and political ties, France was compelled to pay with concessions in domestic economic and political spheres.

After one year of the "leftist experiment," it has become clear that it can be continued successfully only under conditions of detente. Meanwhile, a number of declarations and actions by the French administration--support for the plan of deploying American medium-range missiles, a tougher tone with regard to the Soviet Union, and support for Spain's entry into NATO, and so on--have fostered the growth of tension in the world. As subsequent events reveal, the French government's "turn toward Atlanticism" has failed to deliver France from pressure either on the part of Washington or its main partners in NATO.

The new social-economic course has caused rising dissatisfaction among the working people and social tension in the country.

An analysis of the social-political situation in France during the second year of the leftist government would go beyond the present study. Examination of "the second stage of changes" will be the topic of a separate article.

FOOTNOTES

1. See LE MONDE, 16 October 1981, 29 June 1982; LE POINT, 30 November 1981, p 54; POUVOIRS, No 20, 1982, pp 102-103.
2. See L'EXPRESS, 22 January 1982, p 42.
3. REVOLUTION, No 70, 3 July 1981, p 13.
4. For more detail see V. S. Gusenkov, "Certain Ideological-Political Postulates of the PSF," RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYIY MIR, No 2, 1982.
5. LE POINT, 20 July 1981, pp 41-42.
6. L'HUMANITE, 10 December 1981.
7. For more detail see "Sotsial-demokraticheskiy i burzhuaiznyy reformizm v sisteme gosudarstvenno-monopolisticheskogo kapitalizma" [Social-Democratic and Bourgeois Reformism in the System of State-Monopolistic Capitalism], Moscow, 1980.
8. FAIRE, No 39, 1979, p 42.
9. LE MONDE, 29 December 1981.
10. LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 1 October 1981, p 29.
11. LE MONDE, 29 December 1981.
12. See A. Kudryavtsev, "France on the Path of Economic Transformations," MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 7, 1982, pp 48-56.
13. See LE MATIN, 5 January 1982.
14. See N. K. Kisovskaya, "Gosudarstvennoye predprinimatel'stvo i politicheskaya bor'ba v Italii" [State Enterprise and the Political Struggle in Italy], Moscow, 1977.
15. See M. Crozier, "On ne change pas la societe par decret" [Society Cannot Be Changed by Decree], Paris, 1979, pp 112-113.

16. For more detail see A. M. Kukharchuk, "France: New Rights of Workers in Production," RABOCHIY KASS I SOVREMENNY MIR, No 5, 1982, pp 148-151.
17. F. Bloch-Laine, "Pour une reforme de l'entreprise" [For Reform of Enterprise], Paris, 1963.
18. L'HUMANITE, 5 November 1981.
- 19.-20. Thus, after abolition of military tribunals France, along with Norway and Denmark, will join that small number of countries in which crimes committed by military personnel will be subject to the jurisdiction of the civil courts. See L'HUMANITE, 26 March 1982.
21. LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 4 July 1981, pp 39-40.
- 22.-23. LE MONDE, 11 May 1982.
24. See LE MONDE, 28 September 1982.
25. LE POINT, 7 June 1982, p 62.
26. See LE MATIN, 1 August 1980.
27. See H. Portelli, "Socialisme francais tel qu'il est" [French Socialism As It Is], Paris, 1980, p 137.
28. LE MONDE, 22 June 1982.
29. "Les socialistes face aux patrons" [The Socialists Face the Bosses], Paris, 1977, p 44.
30. See LE MONDE, 18-19 April 1982.
31. L'HUMANITE, 17 April 1982.
32. LES ECHOS, 21 August 1981.
33. LE MATIN, 12 October 1982.
34. See A. Kudryavtsev, "France in the World One Year Later," MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 10, 1982.
35. LE MONDE, 27-28 June 1982.
36. LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 25 December 1982, p 27.
37. LE MONDE, 11 June 1982.

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ROLE OF THE 'GREENS' IN FRG'S POLITICAL ARENA

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[Article by A. S. Pokh and A. B. Trukhan: "The 'Greens' Party in the FRG's Political Arena"]

[Text] A new formation appeared in the FRG's political arena in the late 1970s--the "Greens" party. In its relatively short period of existence it placed deputies in half of the country's Landtags as well as the West Berlin Senate. The "Greens" gained seats in a number of local organs of administration. The total number of deputies of this party, representing its interests at all levels of state administration, exceeds 1300 persons.¹ In elections to the Bundestag on 6 March 1983, 2,167,431 persons (5.6 percent, 27 mandates) voted for the party; it was the biggest internal political sensation in the past 20 years. The rise of the "Greens" has been accompanied by a weakening of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and has disrupted the former balance of political forces, creating for the FRG's ruling class certain difficulties in the use of hitherto efficacious techniques and methods of political control over the behavior and mood of the masses.

The "Greens" arose as a union of participants in the movement to protect the environment and the antiwar movement. While it owes its formation almost exclusively to the sharp rise in the potential of the ecology movement in the 1970s, in recent years the party's greatest successes in the political arena are linked closely to activation of the antiwar movement, in which the party's efforts play a prominent role.

A tradition in the FRG's political culture is the existence of "city hall parties"--that is, separate local associations of citizens striving through participation in elections to district and community councils to express protest against particular governmental measures. At first glance, then, there was nothing unusual in the appearance of voters' lists of organizations of ecological orientation on the eve of the 1978 elections in Hamburg and Lower Saxony. But only at first glance--for behind the concrete, narrowly pragmatic goals of the founders of the "Greens," the "Motleys," and the "Alternatives" (as the predecessors of the current "Greens" party styled themselves) one could discern from the very start a rather broad nationwide base comprising the mounting strength of the environmental movement. Also of considerable importance was the fact that the country lacked an organized political force capable of integrating it.

Starting in the 1970s, millions of the country's citizens took vigorous action against pollution of the environment, expressing their protest in the form of "citizens' initiatives." But no really serious turnaround in the FRG's ecological policies was achieved. The environmental movement so to speak outgrew itself: its massiveness and activeness grew steadily, although its effectiveness remained rather low. There was a mounting sense of increasing urgency to raise the movement to a higher, party-political level, to have it get directly involved in the system of drafting and adopting political decisions, because the other parties could not do so for various reasons.

The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SDPG) proved incapable of incorporating the ecologists' demands in its programs. The trade unions, favoring steady economic growth by their dedication to the false alternative of either environmental protection or jobs, also withheld support from the "Greens." The Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union (CDU-CSU) and the FDP could hardly fail to oppose the new movement, for they were oriented to big capital, which had blocked the implementation of even partial environmental programs adopted by the social-liberal government.

The Communist Party of Germany (CPG) was also unable to serve as the movement's "mouthpiece," primarily because, since it was basically a movement of the middle classes, it was subject to the strong influence of anticommunism. The level of class consciousness of most of its participants was not enough for them to accept the antimonopolistic alternative of the communists.

The buildup of dissatisfaction and energy accumulating in the ecology movement sought an outlet, which was found in forming the ecological parties. As Beddermann, former leader of the "Greens" in Lower Saxony, remarked, the conviction arose that the politicians could be directed into the necessary channel only by depriving them of the voters' ballots.² A definite role was also played by the example of the French and Belgian ecologists, who emerged into the party-political arena earlier than the "Greens" in the FRG.

Environmental protection laws hastily adopted by the Bundestag immediately after the elections in Hamburg and Lower Saxony and before the elections in Hessen and Bavaria diminished somewhat the appeal of the "Greens" parties for the voters: in Hessen they got 2.0 percent and in Bavaria only 1.8 percent.

But the decline was temporary. In the elections to the European Parliament in the summer of 1979, an association of six "Greens" unions under the leadership of (G. Grul'), the founder of "Green Action Is the Future" and former Bundestag member for the CDU, obtained 3.2 percent of the votes, and on 7 October 1979 the "Bremen Greens List" received 5.1 percent of the votes in the Land elections, and four deputies gained seats in the Senate.

These successes constituted an excellent stimulus for the formation of a federal "Greens" party. The decision to create it was taken on 13 January 1980 in Karlsruhe by representatives of four organizations: "Association of Actions of Independent Germans," "Green Action Is the Future," "Green List of Environmental Protectors," and "Green List of Schleswig-Holstein."

The 1980 Bundestag elections were not successful for the "Greens" (they received only 1.5 percent of the votes), but the party's representation in the Landtags did not decline. At present the party is represented in five of the FRG's Landtags: Bremen, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Lower Saxony, Hessen, Hamburg, and also the West Berlin Senate (from 5 percent to 8 percent of the deputy seats).

The protest movement's emergence into the party-political sphere opened up to the democratic movements a new arena of struggle and created a new forum to propagandize their demands.

Polls have shown that the very formation of the "Greens" party has evoked the approval of all classes and social segments.³ According to a poll in 1982, those who favored the party included 22 percent skilled workers, 12 percent trained and auxiliary workers, and 41 percent by and large proletarianized employees and civil servants oriented toward the trade unions.⁴ The "Greens" are supported by that portion of industrial workers and proletarianized employees who link an improvement in their social position to radical changes, to "humanization" of the material-technical base of production and administration. Such a restructuring, according to the party's adherents, should be carried out with the direct participation of the workers who are most "interested" in resolving the most important social-economic and political problems and spontaneously impelled to protest against the rule of the monopolies and the bureaucracy. Most of those who favored the "Greens" in the Land elections and the latest federal elections in 1983 were young people between the ages of 18 and 35, belonging primarily to the new middle classes and generally having a higher education.

In voting for the "Greens," young voters are protesting against restrictions affecting young people's direct participation in handling the most important political matters, against the bureaucratism of the FRG's party-political system. They perceive the direct connection between the arms race and the worsening of the ecology problem, between difficulties in the matter of employment and vocational education. They are alarmed by the growing influence of militarism on the political system. They are the voters who filled the ranks of those favoring the "Greens" in the extraordinary Bundestag elections of March 1983. The "Greens" obtained about 3 percent of the votes of young workers and proletarianized employees who had voted earlier for the SDPG, and about 2 percent of the votes of former adherents of the FDP (chiefly members of the intelligentsia critical of the existing system).

In terms of political preferences, the "Greens" party's permanent electorate is not homogeneous. A minority votes for the "Greens" as a party providing an alternative to the party-political system existing in the FRG. The majority of the permanent electorate, especially wavering voters, contrariwise, views the "Greens" as a new link which should function to supplement the existing party-political system and serve to stimulate it, especially in dealing with acute social-economic and foreign policy problems.

At present the voters, and to an even greater extent members of the "Greens," include many former members of the SDPG, the FDP, and the CDU-CSU. Their former party affiliation does not block them from being nominated to posts of leadership in the new party. Well-known among names of "Greens" party leaders are former Social Democrats P. Kelly and R. Vogt and their SDPG colleagues O. Dinne and W.-D. Hasenklewer, who head the "Greens" factions in the Bremen and Baden-Wuerttemberg Landtags.

The "Greens" party's opportunities to strengthen its positions in the party-political system and the mass democratic movements' utilization of these positions depend largely on the nature and content of the party's programs and its ability to coordinate them with concrete steps forward in the political sphere.

The formation of a federal "Greens" party led to substantial modernization and expansion of the program drawn up on the basis of the quite different programs of the Land associations. A major document adopted in March 1980 at a congress in Saarbruecken was only partially revised at subsequent congresses and conferences. They set forth not only the views of most of the party's members with regard to all problems of foreign and domestic policies but also the views of the minority.

The novelty of the "Greens" party's social-economic program compared with similar documents of the governmental parties and the SDPG is not restricted to particular aspects. Its fundamental distinction consists of defining the criteria and priorities of scientific-technical and social-economic development. While the governmental parties and the SDPG make the resolution of acute social problems dependent on economic growth and on increasing the profitability of the capitalist economy, the program documents of the "Greens" party stipulate that social needs and the resolution of social problems (providing normal working conditions meeting people's needs, environmental protection, and improved health care) should determine the directions and character of scientific-technical progress and economic growth. Both the material-technical base of production and its economic organization must be restructured in accordance with these needs and criteria. As an alternative, the "Greens" propose converting to "a waste-free dynamic economy with a closed production cycle."⁵

In effect, the "Greens" are in opposition to an economy based on capitalist principles. The party's program documents focus on the fact that within such an economy the handling of acute social problems is sacrificed to the interests of profits. They believe that the pursuit of profits is inconceivable without exploitation of the peoples of the developing countries who are struggling against capitalist exploitation, and for this reason it cannot secure stability in international relations.

It is important to note that the "Greens" are revealing the link between the domination of the large corporations and the antisocial policies of the departmental bureaucracy.

The coordination of the program demands and the political struggle is impelling the "Greens" to raise the issue of an alternative democracy. The program's authors proceed on the basis that a genuine reorientation of scientific-technical progress and social-economic development in accordance with social criteria and priorities is possible only with the participation of the masses of the country's population in dealing with the most important economic and political matters. For this reason, the "Greens" are insisting on the creation of economic and social councils participated in by the people at all levels and in all links of administration. The activities of these councils would be directed toward measures of actual rather than merely formal decentralization of administration, the content of which would be to bring it closer to the working people.⁶

Experience in the democratic movements' political struggle reveals the restricted nature of bourgeois democracy and impels the "Greens" to put forth demands on democratizing the political system. They are demanding the lifting of restrictions on the right to hold demonstrations, liquidation of the practice of "vocation banning," and the creation of political conditions guaranteeing the free declaration of will of a protesting minority. The party is strongly against falsification of information.⁷

With regard to foreign policy, the "Greens" demand repeal of the NATO "double decision," as well as a number of unilateral measures for disarmament on the part of the FRG and its allies. These demands, like the rejection of nuclear energy, have not been subjected to revision in any of the Land party programs. The demands set forth by the party reveal clearly that it is coming to be on the left end of the political spectrum of the FRG. They are so radical and uncompromising that the CDU-CSU and the FDP, like the SDPG, are finding it difficult to "take over" the proposals of the "Greens." The inability of the "official" parties to undercut the "Greens" and the acute character of a number of the party's demands, which respond to the interests of the broad masses of the population, undoubtedly constitute the condition for the party's survival in the FRG's party-political system for a more or less lengthy period of time.

One weakness of the goals of the "Greens" is that they are not coordinated within an integral concept of social-political development. Because of the inconsistency and contradictions of the "Greens" party's political orientation its opponents have managed either to falsify it or to interpret it in their own way. The absolutization of partial demands, imparting to them fundamental programmatic character, is making it difficult for the "Greens" to reach compromise with the trade unions, social democrats, and communists.

Concrete ways to convert from today's scientific-technical and economic base to "a dynamic, waste-free economy with a closed cycle" have not been worked out in the program. Ultimately, the proposals on the democratization of society and the state through the introduction of "self-government" are divorced from analysis of the contradictions immanent to today's administrative mechanism. Because of all these shortcomings, the "Greens" party's program has more than a soupcon of utopianism.

The contradictions between the strivings of the "Greens" to be the alternative party and political reality are also manifest in their organizational structure, which was built on pretensions to "a new type of party organization." The party's organizational problems have acquired increasingly greater significance as the number of its members has risen from 9,800 in October 1980 to 24,000 in November 1982⁸ and it has grown in representation in parliamentary bodies at all levels. The "Greens" party's normative charter documents are infused with the spirit of "direct democracy," designed to ensure the participation of party members in resolving its most important affairs and to prevent the rise of "a bureaucratic party apparatus" divorced from the masses and in opposition to them. For this reason, one of the basic principles of the party's organizational structure is separation of mandate and position--that is, a party leader cannot be at the same time a deputy in a parliamentary body at any level. Tenure in a position of leadership in the party is restricted to 2 years, and meetings of the leadership organs at any level are open to all members. The "Greens" are attempting to secure for their deputies in the Landtags and the municipalities an imperative mandate that is not characteristic of the bourgeois and social democratic parties. The "Greens" have instituted the principle of rotation--that is, the replacement of one deputy by another on the expiration of half of his term.

A number of communal parliamentary bodies have worked out measures to maintain constant ties between deputies and the population. In Bielefeld, four "Greens" deputies of the city assembly are obliged every 14 days to report to the general assembly on everything that is being done in city hall and on matters which will be placed on the agenda in the near future. Participants in the assembly discuss the report and pass a resolution containing recommendations to be voted on by the deputies in the city assembly.⁹

The "Greens" party forbids its members to take a seat on company observer councils or to conclude any agreement with entrepreneurs which would entail payment for their services. The party strives to maintain financial independence from influential patrons. It makes use of federal legislation providing for the payment of funds to parties depending on their success in elections. The 1980 Bundestag elections brought the party 2 million marks, and the Landtag elections in Lower Saxony and Bavaria in 1982 brought in 1 million and over 1.2 million marks, respectively. Periodic contributions come in from representatives of the intelligentsia who are sympathetic to the party. In addition, each deputy is obligated to contribute a substantial portion of his salary (up to 70 percent) to the factional fund and into the so-called Ecofund. For example, deputies to the Lower Saxony Landtag keep for themselves only 1,800 marks out of their 8,250-mark monthly salary plus 450 marks for each child.¹⁰

However, the goal of creating a more democratic organizational structure for the "Greens" party is not being implemented systematically. Too much emphasis is being placed on the normative-regulating aspect, and by no means are the efforts that are undertaken realized on the level of living, actual ties between the party's leadership and the masses, between its individual organizations. Frequently, the actual state of affairs is in conflict with the benign wishes of the party's founders. The normative restriction to 2 years'

tenure in post was actually used to replace P. Kelly (who advocated strengthening the leftist alternative orientation of the party) with the pragmatist R. Trampert. In that case the party's statutory regulation was utilized by its "pragmatic"--that is, its more conservative wing in order to strengthen its positions in the leadership.

The lack of an integral ideological system and the noncompulsory nature of the board of directors' decisions on the Land organizations are utilized by the latter to work out their own programs and to conduct policies which differ from the general party policies both in essential and in secondary matters, a situation which complicates the task of strengthening its influence in the party-political system. This can be seen in the practical policies of the party's representatives in the Landtags and in the texts of the program documents. It is possible to single out two basic tendencies: a conservative one (Bremen, Baden-Wuerttemberg) and a leftist one (Hamburg, Hessen, and West Berlin). An intermediate position is occupied by the "Greens" in Lower Saxony but, judging by the criticism to which they have subjected the opposing SDPG, they tend toward the conservative end.

Both Land unions representing the conservative wing in the party justify the conservatism of their policies by the necessity of attracting new adherents. According to O. Dinne, the leader of the Bremen Landtag deputies, 40 percent of the potential "Greens" voters are to be found among the conservative "silent majority."¹¹ The leader of the "Greens" in Baden-Wuerttemberg, W.-D. Hasenklewer, proposes that under conditions of the absolute CDU majority it is necessary to influence the CDU's electorate more vigorously than before.¹² Both leaders postulate the necessity of a party that is open to both sides, a factor which in fact entails a creeping toward the right. The party's conservative policies in Bremen are reflected in its support for reducing the social items in the budget (it was the "Greens" who proposed reducing the 1980 budget by 500 million marks in the sphere of social security and education)¹³ under the pretext of fighting against the "economic growth budget." Some representatives of the "Greens" have gone so far in their creep toward the right that they are seriously thinking of entering into coalition with the CDU after the 1983 Landtag elections.

Another pole is represented by the "Greens" organization in Hamburg, where the positions of the left are strongest. By the summer of 1981, 12 workers groups (made up of representatives of various progressive political currents and "citizens' initiatives," including in collaboration with the "traditional" political and trade union forces from the peace and workers' movements) had drawn up a broad joint program having no counterparts in any of the Lands and touching upon economic and financial policies, the problem of creating jobs, policies in the social sphere and education, alternative energy policies, and the rights of women, students, and renters. A unanimous demand was put forth to repeal the "double decision" of NATO and to convert the military industry to peaceful production.¹⁴

This agreement, however, did not result in a broad voters' alliance. Prior to the senate elections, the "Greens," striving to distance themselves from the CPG, brought to the forefront criticism of the Soviet Union and demanded the total rejection of the peaceful use of atomic energy.

A peculiar position on the left wing of the party is occupied by the "Greens" of Hessen. They are active advocates of the socialization of key enterprises and banks, if only within Hessen to start.¹⁵ Believing that "left-wing socialism, like the workers movement, has failed," they have pretensions to sole representation of all the leftists in Hessen. This is why they rejected the candidacy of M. Koppick, the co-founder of the "Democratic Socialists Party," and expunged from the voters list A. Schubart, leader of the "citizens' initiative" against expansion of the Frankfurt airport, as an advocate of the broader electoral coalition in Hessen.¹⁶

Possibilities for independent alternative influence by the "Greens" on big politics depend largely on strengthening their ties with the workers movement, but the practical policies of the parliamentary newcomers in a number of cases simply blocked any points of contact between the "Greens" and the workers organizations. As an example we can cite the voting of the Marburg and Tuebingen "Greens" in favor of raising electricity rates in order to encourage the population to save energy, or the line taken by the Bremen "Greens," mentioned above, to reduce social spending.

Leaders of the German Trade Union Association frequently accuse the "Greens" of "political charlatanry." Yet there are real opportunities for interaction between the "Greens" and the trade unions in defending the interests of the working people and working out alternative measures to the social-economic strategy of the monopolies. The party's program documents set forth demands that are comprehensible and dear to the trade unions, such as introducing a 35-hour work week, improving working conditions, and providing genuine "parity" participation of the working people at all levels of administration of society. Also in line with the trade unions' ideas are the party's proposals to create new jobs by expanding capital investments in alternative energy sectors and in technology which does not pollute the environment, also proposals to convert the military industry to the production of peaceful goods.

The very existence of the "Greens" party and the initiatives it promotes, therefore, are endorsed by the segment of the working class and the trade union aktiv disturbed by the trade union leadership's concessions to the monopolies and unhappy with the bureaucratization of the apparatus of the mass workers organizations, which prevents the rank-and-file members from exercising influence on the trade unions' decisions. Increasing interest in the "Greens" and in the mass democratic movements is also shown by the unemployed, who have been taking increasing participation in "citizens' initiatives" in favor of employment.

Nevertheless, real interaction between the trade unions and the "Greens" in promoting the social-economic and political demands of the working people has yet to be achieved and runs up against a mass of problems relating chiefly to the vacillations and inconsistencies characteristic of both the "Greens" and the trade unions. The "Greens" party frequently repels potential adherents among the working class and the proletarianized employees by its excessive criticism of economic growth on the present technical-production basis, insisting on immediate dismantling of "hazardous" operations, which would

increase unemployment even more. Some trade union leaders view the very existence of the "Greens" as a potential threat to the preservation of the party-political mechanism set in place in the postwar years and by means of which, primarily thanks to their ties with the SDPG, they have had the opportunity to influence political arrangements. Trade union leaders are disturbed, moreover, by the activization of the rank-and-file members demanding expanded opportunities to participate in trade union decisionmaking and in monitoring the activities of the trade union apparatus. These conflicts between the "Greens" and the trade unions impede the new party's influence on the working class and utilization of the overall potential of the mass organizations to exert pressure on the country's political authorities.

The contradictory position of the "Greens" affects their relations with the "official" parties. The most complex and contradictory relations link the "Greens" with the SDPG, although they have a common adversary. The paradox of their present interaction lies in the fact that they need each other and at the same time fear the consequences of collaboration or coalition.

In the context of SDPG-"Greens" relations one can delineate various currents in both parties. The dividing line in the SDPG runs between the Brandt-Epler position (toward integration of the "Greens") and the Glotz-Vogel position (toward coalition with the "Greens" on certain conditions).

Within the "Greens," in this regard, one can also delineate two currents--"fundamental opposition" (P. Kelly) and "reformist" (R. Trampert). The first steps the party made in the political arena were under the dominating influence of "fundamental opposition," but participation in Realpolitik, especially in parliamentary bodies at various levels, brought the "reformists" to the fore. This was reflected, in particular, in the above-mentioned removal of Kelly and the election of Trampert, who advocates limited cooperation with the SDPG and the trade unions and proposes that conducting a policy of peace and environmental protection is possible only by observing the immediate vital interests of the "employees."¹⁷

Trampert and the party's Land unions of Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, and West Berlin believe that their party is not strong enough to achieve its goals on its own. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that collaboration or coalition with the SDPG is necessary (although the question of coalition or collaboration with the CDU-CSU has never been raised in the party as a whole). The "reformists'" position is shared by 70 to 80 percent of the "Greens" voters. Collaboration with the "Greens" is favored by 56 percent of the SDPG voters and opposed by 42 percent. The similarity of many of their programs speaks in favor of collaboration.

There are many examples of collaboration, and rather successful at that, at the Land and community levels. But where real possibilities have arisen for a coalition of the "Greens" and the social democrats, as it happened in Hamburg and is happening in Hessen, no agreement has been reached. To a certain extent this is also impeded by the so-called "dual strategy" of the "Greens." The reason for the breakup of the coalition of the "Greens," the SDPG, and the FDP in Marburg, for example, was their failure to show up at a

scheduled meeting; the "Greens" deputies left a note explaining that at the moment they considered it more important to take part in an act of protest.

The Bundestag election results changed the initial conditions. Being in the opposition, both parties are in a position to meet each other halfway on many issues. The "Greens" were the first to do so. P. Kelly proposed to the social democrats to collaborate on issues in the struggle against "additional armaments."

Also very interesting and rather paradoxical relations have developed between the "Greens" and the FDP. The free democrats both on the federal and, especially, on the Land level had the most comprehensive environmental protection program. In 1976 their party council came out in favor of a moratorium on the development of atomic energy. But the very first entry of the "Greens" into the political arena cost the FDP seats in the Hamburg and Lower Saxony parliamentary bodies. In 1982 the free democrats were only able to make their way into one Landtag.

Of course, the FDP had other problems besides competition with the "Greens." Since the late 1970s, however, there has been a marked tendency for the "Greens" to force the liberals out on the Land level. This is due to a number of factors. First, disillusionment with the policies of the "establishment" parties equally affected the FDP, which was especially dangerous in view of their small numbers. Second, both parties have drawn their constituents chiefly from the same middle classes. Third, although their demands in regard to environmental protection are similar, the "Greens" place more emphasis on practical implementation, which attracts to them young voters who were formerly in favor of the FDP.

Under conditions when most of the Landtags were going over into the hands of one of the big parties, the FDP lost its role of mediator, while offering practically no alternative. A substantial segment of the FDP voters found such an alternative in the "Greens." Recently, more and more voices in the FDP have been raised in favor of collaboration with the "Greens." And there have been sad comments recalling that a proposal by Beddermann, at the time chairman of the "Green List in Defense of the Environment" in Lower Saxony, to form "an ecology party" out of the "Greens" and the FDP, was rejected in 1978.²⁰

The Bundestag elections brought these parties in conflict with one another. On the one hand, in the major cities the FDP sustained substantial losses in favor of the "Greens;" on the other, the incursion of the "Greens" into the Parliament deprived the CDU-CSU of an absolute majority and thereby gave the FDP a chance to gain entry into the government once more.

Interaction between the "Greens" and the CDU-CSU are less complex and interesting. Up to now the rightist bloc has reacted rather calmly to the successes of the new party, because the liberals and the social democrats have always lost more of their voters to the "Greens" than the rightists.

CDU Chairman H. Kohl was the first West German politician (in autumn of 1978) to announce a qualitative change in the FRG's political landscape, in view of the results of the "Greens" party's emergence into the political arena.

At the same time, the CDU employs a variety of techniques in its policies toward the "Greens." The CDU Congress held in Ludwigshafen in October 1978 focused prime attention on problems of environmental protection.

Another method by which the Christian democrats deal with the "Greens" is illustrated by an appeal made in the summer of 1982 by A. Dregger, former chairman of the Hessen organization, to the parties represented in the Bundestag, proposing to arrange the formation of a government in the Lands and in the federal republic without the support of the "Greens."

Nevertheless, the CDU is attempting to find some forms of collaboration at the local level, reacting sensitively to changes in the positions of the "Greens," as was mentioned above in regard to the "Greens" unions in Bremen and Baden-Wuerttemberg. The chairman of the CDU faction in the Lower Saxony Landtag is inclined to collaborate with the "newcomers" on a whole range of issues instead of keeping distance from them. In many Kreistags and city assemblies the "Greens" and the Christian democrats mutually support each other in political and personnel matters.²¹ In terms of their positions, practical policies, and electorate, however, these parties stand at the opposite poles of the political spectrum.

The German Communist Party took a negative attitude toward the formation of the "Greens" party. Its position during that period can be characterized as follows. An ecological mini-bloc is inadequate to form a party. On the one hand, the formation will serve to undermine the "citizens' initiatives" movement for environmental protection; on the other, it will take votes away from the only party possessing the antimonopolistic alternative--the German Communist Party.

The reasons for the negative attitude toward the "Greens" on the part of West Germany's communists are these: their total rejection of nuclear energy, their dual position in regard to the trade unions, and their anticommunism and anti-Sovietism.²² For their part, the "Greens" have in most cases rejected collaboration with the communists on the party level, justifying this rejection by fundamental differences (for example, on the question of violence), but the basis was almost always the desire to retain the moderate voters.

In the past 2 years there have been definite positive changes in relations between the communists and the "Greens." The communists took part in working out the above-mentioned broad electoral program for elections to the Hamburg senate, in preparation for which they were the first to put forth the slogan of a broad electoral alliance of all leftist and democratic forces, including the "Greens." This proposal was in effect for all subsequent Landtag elections and was endorsed by the party for Bundestag elections. But the "Greens" did not go any further than collaboration in drafting the program. They also refused to sign a joint call by many organizations and groups for an antiwar demonstration on 10 June 1982.

Communists approach the "Greens" party realistically, considering its political importance and its progressive orientation on a number of issues. After the extraordinary West German Bundestag elections held in March 1983, the German Communist Party came out with an announcement in which the party declared support for any initiatives of the "Greens" directed against the deployment of American medium-range missiles on West German territory. The German communists are doing everything they can to strengthen the antimilitarist positions of the "Greens" and consolidate the new party's links with the mass antiwar movements.

A total of 27 deputy seats in the Bundestag--that is unquestionably a triumph for both the "Greens" party and the democratic, primarily antiwar movement. "From now on," declared Party Secretary R. Trampert at a press conference, "the 'Greens' party in the Bundestag will represent the mass movement of the West German public in support of peace and disarmament, for environmental protection."

Nevertheless, this triumph was smaller than the leaders of the "Greens" expected. The election results did not enable the party to achieve one of its main goals--to prevent the coming to power of the rightist bloc. The distribution of forces in the Bundestag prevents the "Greens" from effectively fighting "additional armament" by conventional parliamentary means, which is their prime task according to the unanimous declarations of their leaders. The "Greens" are considering the possibility of moving nonparliamentary actions of nonviolent resistance (hunger strikes and so on) into the Bundestag, as P. Kelly once announced.

The "Greens" factions' first actions one week after the elections were events promoting peace. The question is being considered of sending parliamentary delegations to Moscow, Washington, and Geneva. At a press conference held after the elections, representatives of the "Greens" announced that the party intends to play the role of "a clear and constructive opposition." The "Greens" will come out against implementation of the NATO "double decision," against the arms race, and in favor of environmental protection. Also being considered is the drafting of an immediate employment program, measures to combat unemployment, especially among young people. They have expressed readiness to collaborate with other parties represented in the Bundestag to achieve these goals. How well they succeed in resolving these complex tasks will largely determine the political fate of the "Greens."

FOOTNOTES

1. HANDELSBLATT, 15 November 1982, p 3.
2. D. Murphy et. al., "Protest: Grune, Bunte und Steurrebellen. Ursachen und Perspektiven" [Protest: The Greens, Motleys and Tax Rebels. Causes and Prospects], Reinbeck, 1979, p 15.
3. Ibid., pp 148-149.

4. CAPITAL, 1982, H. 9, p 111.
5. "Die Grunen. Das Bundesprogramm" [The Greens. The Federal Program], 1980, p 4ff.
6. Ibid., pp 28-29.
7. Ibid., pp 30-31.
8. BLATTER FUR DEUTSCHE, No 4, 1980, p 395; U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 1 November 1982, p 26.
9. DER STERN, No 14, 27 March 1980, p 28.
10. HANDELSBLATT, 25 March 1982, p 4.
11. BLATTER FUR DEUTSCHE, No 10, 1982, p 1210.
12. Ibid., pp 1209-1210.
13. MARXISTISCHE BLATTER, No 4, 1980, p 63.
14. BLATTER FUR DEUTSCHE, No 10, 1982, p 1206.
15. HANDELSBLATT, 1 April 1982, p 6.
16. BLATTER FUR DEUTSCHE, No 10, 1982, p 1206.
17. DER SPIEGEL, 22 November 1982, No 47, p 30-31.
18. Ibid.; DER STERN, 25 November 1982, No 48, p 273; DER SPIEGEL, 11 October 1982, No 41, p 39.
19. BLATTER FUR DEUTSCHE, No 10, 1982, pp 1212-1213.
20. D. Murphy et. al., op. cit., p 38.
21. BLATTER FUR DEUTSCHE, No 10, 1982, p 1210.
22. MARXISTISCHE BLATTER, No 1, 1979, p 26ff.

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IDEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS WITH SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC POLICIES

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[Review by V. Ya. Shveytser of the following books: Vojtech Erban "Socialisticka Internacionala. Partner a protivnik" [Socialist Internationale. Partner and Adversary], Prague, Horizont, 1982, 152 pp; Ladislav Hrzal, Pavol Mest'an "'Demokraticky Socializmus' v sluzbach antikomunizmu" ["Democratic Socialism" in the Service of Anticommunism], Bratislava, Pravda, 1981, 218 pp; Vojtech Erban "Sotsialisticheskiy Internatsional. Partner i protivnik" [Socialist Internationale. Partner and Adversary], Prague, 1982; Ladislav Hrzal, Pavol Mest'an "'Demokraticheskiy Sotsializm' na sluzhbe antikommunizma" ["Democratic Socialism" in the Service of Anticommunism], Bratislava, 1981. Original title: "Problems of Ideology and Policy of Contemporary Social Democracy (Studies by Czechoslovak Scholars)"]

[Text] In recent years, social scientists of the socialist countries have focused considerable attention on the study of the ideology and policies of contemporary social democracy. Czechoslovak scholars have also contributed to the study of these problems.

A book published in Prague about the Socialist Internationale is the last work of V. Erban, the recently deceased staff member of the Prague Institute of International Relations. The author focused major attention on the activities of the international organization of the social democrats in the 1970s, at the same time tracing the preceding evolution of its ideological-political positions. The work portrays the Socialist Internationale as the successor to the Workers Socialist Internationale of the period between the wars, some of whose members (for example L. Blume, (Yu. Brauntal'), and C. Huysmans) in the postwar period took active part in the complex and contradictory process of restoring the social-reformist center. In evaluating the Socialist Internationale's Frankfurt Declaration, which was approved at its First Congress in 1951, the author notes that this social reformist document formulated the general outlines of the ideological credo of "democratic socialism"--an apologia for the "general welfare" state, the political democracy of a bourgeois society, and certain economic achievements of capitalism. On the plane of international politics, the Socialist Internationale's very first program document proclaimed an unequivocal orientation toward "Atlantism," including in the document concoctions about the aggressive nature of the USSR and the other countries of East Europe and thereby from the very beginning mapping out its course toward the West's shared strategy of the "Cold War."

In the following 20-year period or so, and this is solidly argued in the materials contained in the book--the Socialist Internationale's main ideological-political line defined both the ideological-theoretical positions of social democracy and its practical actions. Thus, the "program turn" of European social democracy in the late 1950s and early 1960s attested overall to its acceptance of the main ideas and principles of "democratic socialism."

In just the same way, the political practices of the member parties of the Socialist Internationale were fully in tune with the course of action, proclaimed in Frankfurt-on-Main, toward a class peace with the bourgeoisie, which meant a guarantee of the inviolability of its fundamental interests in exchange for the possible satisfaction of some of the most pressing needs of the working people. In the sphere of foreign policies, social democracy--especially in the NATO countries--unwaveringly observed the "code of fidelity" to Atlantic solidarity, endorsing almost all the aggressive actions of imperialism.

The world, however, did not stand still. In the late 1960s and early 1970s there were marked changes which also affected the social democratic movement. As a result of the "peace offensive" of the USSR and its allies, supported by the peace-loving community and realistic politicians in the capitalist world, including authoritative figures in social democracy, the climate began to improve in relations between states belonging to different social systems. At the same time there was a worsening of the internal contradictions of state-monopolistic capital, which had entered a crisis phase that it has not overcome to this day, and a worsening of the class struggle; this signaled the ideological bankruptcy of the stereotypes of the "general welfare" state. The result was a general ideological-political crisis for social democratism and a deepening of the process of differentiation both in the parties making up the Socialist Internationale and in the international organization itself.

Back in the late '60s and early '70s, V. Erban writes, "the period of 'de-ideologization' in the social democratic parties came to an end and a time of lively theoretical debates gradually ensued, a time of so-called 'reideologization'" (p 37)--a process signaling social-reformism's striving to adapt its theory to changing circumstances. The author justly emphasizes that an extremely difficult and lengthy process was taking place, in which social democracy was searching for a modus vivendi both over the shorter and the longer term (pp 98-99).

One of the consequences of "reideologization" was a strengthening of leftist tendencies in social democracy, which were manifested primarily in the process of a new "program turn" which was characteristic in the 1970s of almost all the Socialist Internationale's West European parties. In contrast to the programs adopted in the late 1950s and early 1960s, social democracy's new long-term documents increased the proportion of demands having an anti-monopolistic orientation in many cases. Their adoption into the program is to be credited to the left wing, to those who were able to break out of the framework of the conventional reformist stereotypes. The left, V. Erban remarks, has today become not only the "leaven" of ideological processes--they are also "oriented toward systematic implementation of program promises

and reforms of an antimonopolistic nature" (p 33). In dealing with such a complex process as differentiation, however, the author is not inclined to reduce it totally to the prevailing and sometimes oversimplified fragmentation of social democracy into leftists, rightists, and "centrists." The spectrum of hues in social democracy, he notes, is rather complex and variegated, and there are many intermediate currents among the main ones. And all of them are part and parcel of social democracy: the right wing's leaning toward collaboration with the bourgeoisie does not make its policies identical to bourgeois policies, nor does the fact that some of the leftist-socialist positions coincide with those of Marxism-Leninism mean that the leftist socialists are in all cases willing to collaborate closely with communists.

Analyzing the various aspects of the activities of the Socialist Internationale as an international organization, the author focuses attention on what is perhaps the main element in its course of action--participation in the process of detente in the 1970s. The book presents detailed description of the course of foreign policy debates at the 12th through 14th Socialist Internationale congresses and the resolutions that were adopted on the international situation and examines in depth the results of numerous meetings of the Socialist Internationale's Buro and conferences of social democratic leaders held under the aegis of this organization. Noting a degree of constructiveness in its approach to detente, the author points out the importance of positions stipulated in the documents which unquestionably enhanced the efforts of advocates of reducing foreign policy confrontations. The 12th Vienna Congress in 1972, for example, declared social democracy's support for the FRG's Ostpolitik, which was proclaimed by Chancellor W. Brandt. The 13th Congress held in Geneva in 1976 approved the results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

In this regard it is worthwhile to point out that in 1972 in the FRG and in 1976 in the United States considerable clamor was heard from "skeptics" who did not consider the above-mentioned steps in the context of detente to be of prime importance, alleging them to be a kind of "Red trap." In these circumstances, the constructive position of such a prestigious organization as the Socialist Internationale unquestionably played a vital positive role.

The significance of its realistic attitude in international affairs, however, should not be overestimated, especially in light of discrepancies among some of the Socialist Internationale's peace-promoting declarations with regard to the problem of military detente and the specific policies of certain of the parties that are members of this organization and are active participants in the militaristic preparations of NATO. V. Erban cites specific examples of how some representatives of the social democratic camp, under the pretext of fighting for "human rights," are willing to interfere in the internal affairs of neighboring countries, including Czechoslovakia, and he exposes the inconsistency of the thesis, which is current in social democratic circles, of the allegedly equal responsibility of the "superpowers"--that is, the USSR and the United States--for the worsening of international tension; he also deals a solid rebuttal to the ideas of some members of the Socialist Internationale who believe that detente is exclusively the fruit of social democratic policies.

The social democrats are nevertheless aware that detente responds to the fundamental interests of the social democratic movement itself as well as hired workers of physical and intellectual labor who support social democracy. The social democrats, V. Erban emphasizes, "understand that without disarmament it is impossible to liquidate the danger of a world war...rising expenditures on the arms race inevitably restrict--and at a certain point can in fact make impossible--social democracy's realization of the reforms it has promised, which will entail its loss of the support of the broad masses of working people...." (p 124).

Another global problem to which the Socialist Internationale devoted special attention in the 1970s was that of relations between the industrially developed and the developing countries. The author acknowledges the social democrats' contribution to formulation of the North-South concept, primarily with the help of the "Brandt Commission," the results of whose efforts were endorsed at the 15th Socialist Internationale Congress (Madrid, 1980). In assessing the social democratic approach to the problem, the author emphasizes both a number of positive aspects in its analysis (in particular, recognition of the negative aspects of the activities of the multinationals) and the inconsistency of the social-reformists' proposed option of improving economic ties between North and South, rooted in the neocolonialist approach to the matter in practice.

The author also presents a genuinely realistic appraisal of a particular characteristic of the Socialist Internationale's development--namely, polycentrism, which arose because it came to include parties involved in the national-liberation movement. He emphasizes that the Socialist Internationale's leaders now recognize the necessity of dealing with its considerable internal differentiation, which is becoming even more pronounced with the inclusion of organizations of the developing countries (p 108). He is right. Let us add that in joining the Socialist Internationale, the political movements of the liberated countries are doing it primarily for the purpose of gaining support for their positions on the part of the influential international organization. As a result, however, the Socialist Internationale's ideological platform is becoming increasingly loose, increasingly less purely social-democratic, absorbing the value elements which are characteristic of its new members. To qualify this process unequivocally is rather difficult, because among the new members there are parties of the bourgeois-reformist and nationalistic persuasions as well as those which, with certain reservations, can be classified as revolutionary-democratic.

Whereas V. Erban's monograph presents the Socialist Internationale's ideological-political course of action as well as certain phenomena characteristic of social democracy as a whole, the book "'Democratic Socialism' in the Service of Anticommunism" views the theoretical positions and practices of one of the leading parties of the Socialist Internationale--the Socialist Party of Austria (SPA). The authors are the well-known Czechoslovak philosophers L. Hrzal and P. Mest'an. They have chosen as the object of their study a major national detachment of West Europe's social democracy, one which has made a substantial contribution to the drafting of the ideological-

political credo of social reformism.* In addition, the leaders of the SPA--B. Pitterman, (K. Chernets), and O. Pollak--have been prominent figures in the Socialist Internationale. In recent years an active role in this organization has been played by B. Kreisky, the leader of the SPA and the head of the Austrian government in 1970-1983, who is one of the vice presidents of the Socialist Internationale.

Right-wing Austrian social democracy has striven to function as a kind of ideological mentor of the antisocialist forces, who in the late 1960s attempted to change the socialist character of Czechoslovakia's social development. Undoubtedly this gives the book's authors grounds for examining the Austrian variety of "democratic socialism" with particular critical attention.

Examining the theoretical positions of the postwar SPA, the authors focus primarily on its main program documents--"Program of Actions" (1947), "Vienna Program" (1958), and, finally, the "New Program of the SPA" which was adopted in 1978. Each of the three documents has left its clear stamp on its time.

The 1947 program still showed traces of Austro-Marxist theses concerning the class struggle and embodied rather sharp criticism of capitalism, for this document appealed primarily to the working class.

Ten years later the guidelines had changed. The SPA was more concerned with preserving the governmental coalition with the bourgeois People's Party, with developing a system of "social partnership," and the main principle of the 1958 program came to be "class collaboration" between exploiters and exploitees.

This program served the specific political interests of the socialists up until the mid-1970s, when new phenomena in the mechanism of the capitalist economy--in particular a cyclical crisis unmatched throughout the postwar period--forced the SPA leadership to think again about "a change of scenery." They also took account of another circumstance, in this case a specifically Austrian one: the SPA had formed a one-party government since 1970. What was needed was a document in which it demonstrated its plans for the future to the public.

Not concerned with elucidating all aspects of the 1978 program, the authors focus their attention on the "Austro-socialist" treatment of the problems of the state and democracy: the program's authors present an apologia for the bourgeois state, denying its class character and asserting that the mechanism of its power only requires some adjustment. The SPA's ideologues depict democracy as an element of contemporary capitalism that is neutral in class terms.

* On a broader plane the theory and practices of "democratic socialism" were critically examined by one of the authors--L. Hrzal--in a work published previously: Hrzal, L., "Teorie a praxe demokratickeho socialismu" [Theory and Practice of Democratic Socialism], Prague, 1976.

Presenting solid arguments concerning the essence of the problem, L. Hrzal and P. Mest'an qualify this characteristic of social reformist ideology as evidence of its lack of contact with the realities of bourgeois society, its incongruity with it. The drafters of the program, in essence, "are taking the positions of defenders of bourgeois democracy, proclaiming it to be the ideal form of administering a state, the apogee of development of political organizations" (p 93).

The assertions of the Austrian adepts of "democratic socialism" concerning the supra-class nature of democracy and the state attest to the amorphousness and inconsistency of their ideological positions. Commenting on the eclecticism of the new SPA program, the authors draw a conclusion which goes beyond evaluation of the document itself: "The position of all social reformists--not just the Austrians--in the struggle for democracy is uniformly contradictory. On the one hand they defend bourgeois democracy as a form of state, as the basis of existence of social-political movements. On the other hand, since they are involved with the interests of state-monopolistic capital, they view democracy and the state from the standpoint of this system" (p 61).

The illusory nature of the "Austro-socialist" variety of "supra-class" democracy is also confirmed by the treatment, which is prevalent in the SPA, of the system of workers' participation in the administration of the economy. Coparticipation in Austria is in line with the system of "social partnership" and is a component part of it. Certain legislative innovations enacted in this sphere in the 1970s did not fundamentally alter coparticipation's orientation toward preservation of the principles of "class peace" in economic life. Arguing against the social-reformist apologia for coparticipation, the authors formulate an important theoretical postulate: "The main function of genuine coparticipation in decisionmaking lies in the fact that it should serve as the deciding lever in the organization of the working class, in developing its class consciousness...it should provide the working class with experience in the class struggle, the experience of managing the state economy" (p 117).

Having touched upon the problem of coparticipation in the form that the SPA ideologues treat it, the authors of the work have raised an array of problems relating to the functioning of the "social partnership" system in Austria. They have managed in compact form to portray the essence of this national variety of "class partnership," linking it to a "specific form of domination by state-monopolistic capital" (p 95).

Having revealed the ideological aspect of this phenomenon, L. Hrzal and P. Mest'an have also revealed the forms of "social partnership" in the specific circumstances of the Austrian economy. They present a detailed description of the functioning of the Parity Commission for Prices and Wages, which has been in existence for 25 years now. This commission, which is made up of government civil servants, higher trade union functionaries, and big entrepreneurs, is in essence an organ controlled by no one. Although the decisions it draws up appear outwardly to be purely recommendations, in the context of the practices of the "social partnership" system they take on the force of law. In essence these decisions constitute compromise, but compromise which

matches the vital interests of capital. It is no wonder, the authors remark, that the Parity Commission functions with precision under any government and any correlation of forces in Parliament (p 101).

L. Hrzal and P. Mest'an believe that all the main aspects of the Austrian variety of "democratic socialism" indirectly serve its overall anticommunist orientation. In essence this doctrine is called upon to serve for the working people of the West as the antithesis of Marxist-Leninist principles of building socialism as advocated by the communist movement.

The events in Czechoslovakia in the late 1960s and the events in Poland in 1980-1981 demonstrate that massive social-reformist propaganda, unless it is properly rebuffed, leads to a situation in which the segment of a socialist state's working class and intelligentsia that is unstable in terms of ideology begins to accept the social democratic concept of social development. The dangers of this kind of ideological erosion are warned against by the authors of "'Democratic Socialism' in the Service of Anticommunism."

The book by V. Erban and the monograph by L. Hrzal and P. Mest'an constitute a serious study of the complex, multi-plane phenomenon of social democracy, its policies and ideology, by scholars of a fraternal country.

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PRK ENVOY ON ECONOMIC SUCCESSES, SRV TROOPS, RELATIONS WITH THAILAND

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[Interview with Hor Nam Hong, PRK ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary in the Soviet Union, granted to NEW TIMES correspondent Vladimir Godyna: "Dialogue Will Prevail"]

[Text] Question: What could you say about your country's present economic situation?

Answer: I would first of all like to dwell on events of slightly more than four years ago. When in January 1979 we liberated the country from the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan regime of genocide, our people under the leadership of the People's Revolutionary Party, embarked on the rehabilitation of the ruined country in extremely difficult conditions, deprived of virtually every prime necessity and being totally emaciated. In fact, we had to start from zero: all economic, social and political structures in Kampuchea had been totally destroyed.

In 1979, the first year after liberation, we managed to till only 700,000 hectares of rice fields. This year rice, our main wealth, occupies already almost two million hectares. In other words, sown areas have been almost trebled. I think there is no need to comment on this fact. This year technical crops occupy 42,700 hectares--twice more than in 1981. Also growing are [word indistinct] plantations--they have grown by 11,800 hectares.

Industry has visibly gained in strength, especially the textile and food industries, and also handicrafts. Here our successes can match those in agriculture. There is no need to say that all this is having the most beneficial influence on the process of stabilization. Signs of this are seen everywhere.

I cannot but mention our successes in education. Already now they make themselves felt in our economic development and will yield particularly abundant fruit in the future. In the 1982-83 school year the number of pupils of elementary and secondary schools reached the impressive figure of 1,690,000. The number of students of establishments of higher learning is growing and the system of vocational training is being expanded.

To this day we face many difficulties, including economic ones. But the worst is behind us--the Kampuchean people are not starving, their living conditions are visibly improving. On the whole, life has returned to normal and the situation in the country is becoming increasingly more stable.

Question: How is Kampuchea's cooperation with the Soviet Union developing?

Answer: The successes in the social, political and economic normalization in people's Kampuchea are inseparable from the substantial support given us by the Soviet Union, Vietnam and other fraternal socialist countries.

Kampuchean-Soviet cooperation--trade and economic--is growing with every year. The Soviet Union effectively and selflessly helps us in many fields. This includes a communication system via satellites, the restoration of rubber plantations, water conservancy projects and restoration of irrigation systems that are so badly needed for developing the national economy which, as is known, is based primarily on agriculture. We highly value Soviet assistance in organizing the medical services. Soviet specialists have rebuilt a big hospital which was a gift of the USSR to the people of Kampuchea in the 1960s. And these are only some examples of the multifaceted internationalist assistance given by your country to mine.

Question: Kampuchea's successes in stabilizing the situation in the country evidently played a big role in the adoption of the decision by Kampuchea and Vietnam to reduce the contingent of Vietnamese volunteer troops in your country.

Answer: Yes, of course. The world public knows about the two withdrawals of Vietnamese volunteers from Kampuchea--in July last year, and this May. Not all know, however, that troops had been withdrawn also in 1980 and 1981. This was simply not reported at the time. All this is convincing proof of Kampuchea's confidence in its strength. I refer to the social, political and economic situation in the country and, last but not least, to the increased combat preparedness of our armed forces.

In short, as the possibility arises the number of Vietnamese volunteers in Kampuchea is reduced. We hope that these actions of good will will be duly appreciated in the countries of our region, including Thailand. We strive to turn the Kampuchean-Thai border into a border of peace and friendship. We want to encourage the tendency toward dialogue between the three countries of Indo-China and the ASEAN countries, so that Southeast Asia would become a zone of peace, stability and cooperation.

Question: The enemies of People's Kampuchea apparently fear the impact this action may have on public opinion as they are trying in every way to belittle the importance of the withdrawal of a part of the Vietnamese volunteers.

Answer: I would say not only to belittle, but to distort the actual state of affairs, to smear Kampuchea and Vietnam. How else can we assess their

allegations that new contingents are being brought in to replace the troops withdrawn from Kampuchea? All these unworthy doings are on the conscience of the organizers of the vile propaganda campaigns. We pursue an honest policy. If the withdrawal of a part of the Vietnamese volunteers is not used by any quarters to threaten our security, the number of the volunteers will be further decreased, as it was decided in February at the summit conference of the three Indo-China countries in Vientiane.

Now about the situation on the border with Thailand. In April we conducted mopping-up operations in the jungles of that area. They were a success. Numerous bases of the remnants of Pol Pot's former army and of other Khmer reactionaries were smashed. In particular, bases in Phnom Chhat and O-Smach. Hundreds of insurgents were killed or taken prisoner. Large quantities of arms were seized. The enemy no longer has the possibility to launch large-scale operations, although it does have bases on Thai territory and gets substantial assistance in arms and ammunition from other countries.

It is a pity that despite our restraint and good will the military authorities in Thailand encourage the subversive activities of the Pol Potists and other Khmer reactionaries. More than that, hardly a day passes without Thailand violating the territorial integrity of People's Kampuchea. Thus, during the last week of July five Thai planes and helicopters penetrated up to three kilometres deep into Kampuchean territory, 237 Thai vessels, including two naval ships, violated our territorial waters in the area of the Koh Kong and Koh Tang islands, while Thai artillery fired on the territory of our northwestern provinces on 52 occasions.

Question: What can you say about Thailand's proposal that the Vietnamese volunteer troops should be withdrawn 30 kilometres from the Kampuchean-Thai border?

Answer: I must say that Kampuchea, Vietnam and Laos have already made many constructive proposals to which no answer has been made to this day. Thailand's concern for its security is understandable. That is its lawful right. But we too are entitled to ensure our country's security. This prompts the question: Can Thailand demand the establishment of a 30-kilometre zone, the more so as a preliminary condition for talks, at a time when it allows the Pol Pot bands to make incursions into People's Kampuchea from the territory of Thailand to carry out acts of subversion? We are convinced that consideration should be given to the security of both countries. It is for this that we strive when expressing the desire to turn the Kampuchean-Thai border into a border of peace and friendship.

In conclusion I would like to stress that the foreign policy of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, as it is said in our constitution, is a policy of "independence, peace and nonalignment." My country adheres to the principled foreign policy course aimed at establishing peace and friendship among peoples. If we are to speak about our neighbors, in particular Thailand, we adhere to a policy of peace, friendship and good-neighborship with it.

Together with the other fraternal countries of Indo-China we have made numerous concrete proposals--at the annual conferences of the foreign ministers of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, and at the first meeting of the top leaders of these countries--imbued with sincerity and good will. We have advanced the idea of a dialogue between the three countries of Indo-China and the ASEAN countries. We continue to support this idea. And although the ASEAN countries have not yet given a positive answer to our proposals, we believe that the developing tendency toward dialogue between the two groups of countries will gain in strength.

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